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Abstract 
 
Group lending has received a great attention from economists and policymakers for its 
successful delivery of credit to poor borrowers and its role in alleviating poverty in the developing 
countries. The success of group lending in providing credit to poor borrowers has been attributed to 
its ability to mitigate the asymmetry of information and enforcement problems in credit markets. 
The ability of group lending institutions to overcome the asymmetry of information and 
enforcement problems has been theorized to be the driving force behind their outreach to the poor, 
their sustainability, and their repayment performance. While there is a host of theoretical models 
explaining the success of group lending, empirical research has lagged behind. The focus of this 
thesis is to explore the determinants of repayment rates in group lending institutions taking the case 
of one Jordanian institution. 
We use data from a self designed survey of 160 borrowing groups of the Microfund for 
Women in Jordan to test the effect of screening, peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on 
borrowing groups’ repayment behavior. Two measures of repayment from the data base of the 
Microfund for Women are used. We find that these theoretical variables of interest are indeed 
important in explaining repayment behavior.  
This thesis investigates the impact of differences in the behavior of different group members 
on the repayment performance of the group. The survey data allows us to analyze whether the 
impact of joint liability, screening and monitoring activities and social ties of the group leader on 
repayment performance differ from those of the rest of the group members. We find that the group 
leader has a more significant impact in improving the repayment behavior of the group than the rest 
of the group members.  
 v
  





The World Bank has estimated that in 2001, 1.1 billion people had consumption levels below 
$1 a day and 2.7 billion lived on less than $2 a day. Many believe that credit can play a vital role in 
reducing poverty. This belief is based on the hope that the latent entrepreneurial capacity of the 
poor would be stimulated with the availability of small-scale loans. Such loans could help the poor to 
generate income, build viable businesses, mitigate their vulnerability to external shocks, and self-
empower, especially women, to become socially and politically active. The poor, however, lack 
collateral, steady employment, steady flow of income, and a verifiable credit history all of which are 
minimum qualifications to gain access to the formal financial sector. The poor address their financial 
needs through a variety of informal channels. Credit, for example, might be available from the 
informal money lenders but usually at a very high interest rate.  
One channel to deliver financial services to the poor is through microfinance. It is conceived 
to be an alternative to both formal financial sector, which in most developing countries serve less 
than 20% of the population (Gallardo, Outtara, Randhawa and Steel (2003)), and informal sources 
such as moneylenders. Microfinance is the provision of small loans (microcredit) and other financial 
services to low income clients to help them engage in productive activities or grow their small 
businesses. Microfinance differs in key concepts from conventional banking in that it employs 
different collateral substitutes to deliver and recover loans. Such collateral substitutes include group 
lending, dynamic incentives which allow the loan size to increase over time upon satisfactory 
repayment, mandatory savings, and regular repayment schedules. These collateral substitutes are 
important for both the poor borrowers who usually lack enough collateral and available credit 
history and for lenders operating in countries with weak law enforcement.  
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Beginning in the 1950s, many poverty alleviation programs began to introduce subsidized 
credit. These programs were rarely successful. They suffered massive erosion of their capital base 
due the high cost of subsidies, the low loan repayment rates, and the diversion of credit from the 
intended recipients to the hands of the better off (Adams, Graham, and Pischke (1984)).  
In 1974, professor Muhammad Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank, on a field trip with his 
students to a poor village in Bangladesh, met a woman who made bamboo stools for sale. Yunus 
learned that the women after repaying the money lender for the raw bamboos, sometimes at rates as 
high as 10% a week, was unable to support herself or her family. He also learned that there were 
many women in the village suffered from a similar situation. Yunus realized that had these women 
were able to borrow at some advantageous rates, they would have been able to raise themselves 
above poverty level. Taking the matter into his own hands, Yunus lent the equivalent of $ 27 to 42 
women from his own pocket. Shortly after that, the women were able to repay the loans and 
continued to support themselves and their families. This success originated the embryonic idea 
behind the Grameen Bank and the concept of microfinance. As of July 2005, Grameen Bank 
disbursed $ 4.94 billion in loans to 5 million, 96 percent were women.  
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as a social innovator providing financial services to the 
working poor, those who were previously considered as poor repayment risk or “un-bankable.” 
These services include providing small loans (microcredit), saving and insurance with microcredit 
loans being the most common microfinance product. By December 31, 2004, 3,164 microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) have reported reaching 92,270,289 clients, 66,614,871 of whom were considered 
among the poorest (those who were in the bottom half of their country’s poverty line or below $1 a 
day) when they took their first loan. Of these poorest clients, 83.5 percent were women.  Table 1 
shows the expansion of the MFIs and the number of clients reached worldwide.  1
                                                 
1 Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2005 
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Table 1: MFIs Expansion 
 
Year Number of MFIs Number of Total Clients
in Millions 
Number of Poorest Clients
in Millions 
1997 618 13.5 7.6 
1998 925 21 12.2 
1999 1,065 23.6 13.8 
2000 1,567 30.7 19.3 
2001 2,186 55 26.9 
2002 2,572 67.6 41.6 
2003 2,931 80.9 54.8 
2004 3,164 92.3 66.6
 
Note: Numbers of MFIs and Total Client Numbers Reporting to the Microcredit Summit 
 
Much research has shown that microfinance reduces poverty. Hossain (1988) showed that 
the Grameen Bank services improved employment, income generation, and social indicators of its 
participants. Khandker (1998) and Pitt and Khandker (1998) used a joint research project of the 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and the World Bank 1991/1992 survey data and found 
evidence that microfinance programs in Bangladesh help the poor through smoothing consumption 
and assets accumulation. This research found that microfinance promotes investment in human 
capital, raise awareness of health issues, and helps women acquire assets of their own and empower 
them in household decision making. To assess the sensitivity of the earlier findings on the 
microfinance impacts on poverty, Khandker (2005) carried out an impact assessment using the 
1998/1999 follow-up survey to the 1991/1992 survey done by the Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies and the World Bank. He found that poverty among poor borrowers of the 
microfinance programs continues to decline. A study by Townsend and Kaboski (2006) showed that 
families in Thailand with access to credit invested and consumed more than those without access to 
credit. A broad examination of multiple programs across multiple regions by the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (CGAP) concludes that microfinance is an effective strategy to reduce poverty.  
MFIs have two major lending methodologies; group and individual lending. Group lending 
involves lending to a group of borrowers who are jointly liable for a loan. It creates its own type of 
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collateral and has received a lot of attention from economic theorists and policymakers. Individual 
lending often requires collateral that the poor borrower can pledge; the value of the collateral and 
the loan size may not be closely related. Both lending methodologies use different mechanisms to 
secure high repayment rates. These include joint liability, dynamic incentives, mandatory savings, 
and regular repayment schedules. Joint liability helps to overcome adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and enforcement that impede a lender from providing credit to borrowers. Since group members are 
jointly liable for a loan, group lending creates incentives for individual group members to screen out 
risky borrowers, monitor each others’ actions and enforce repayment. Using dynamic incentives 
allows the loan size to increase over time upon satisfactory repayment. The incentive to get a larger 
loan size and the threat to cut off any future lending if loans are not repaid can improve repayment. 
Dynamic incentives can be used in both group lending and individual lending programs. Some MFIs 
require that borrowers save a percentage of their loans that can be withdrawn upon leaving. These 
savings can serve as partial collateral since the program can use them to secure any unpaid loans. 
One feature of many MFIs is that small amount of repayments starts shortly after disbursement 
based on weekly or biweekly schedules. Regular repayment schedules can function as screening 
device against undisciplined borrowers and as an early warning to the program about potential 
repayment problems. They also pressure borrowers to prioritize repayment before cash is consumed 
or diverted.2  
All these collateral-substitute mechanisms contributed to the high repayment rates that are in 
excess of 95 percent as reported by major microfinance institutions. Data from the Micro Banking 
Bulletin shows evidence against the conventional wisdom that lending to the poor is risky; after 
adjusting for inflation and taking out subsidies received, 63 of the world’s top MFIs had an average 
rate of return of about 2.5% of total assets. This compares favorably with the returns in the 
                                                 
2 Morduch (1999) provides an excellent review of these mechanisms.  
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commercial banking sector (CGAP). Many MFIs proved that financial services to the poor can 
cover their full costs through appropriate interest pricing, enhancing efficiency, and relentless focus 
on repayment. 
High repayment rates benefit both the MFI and the borrower. They allow the MFI to cut the 
interest rate on loans which reduces the cost of credit to borrowers and allow them to have more 
access to it. High repayment rates help reduce dependence on subsidies from donors and improve 
sustainability level of the MFIs. Since many MFIs are still dependant on donors’ subsidies, good 
repayment performance is a key variable for the MFIs to keep the sources of fund open as it reflects 
a good signal to the donors and international funding agencies of the MFI’s worthiness.   
Group lending received a great attention from economists and policymakers for its ability to 
solve the asymmetry of information and enforcement problems that face the financial institutions in 
developing country. While there is a host of theoretical models explaining the success of group 
lending programs, empirical research has lagged behind. This thesis contributes to the joint liability 
literature by investigating whether the theoretical models and the data tell a similar story. The thesis 
uses a self designed survey that the researcher carried out in spring of 2005. Among other questions, 
the survey contains questions that capture the activities of screening, monitoring, and enforcement 
and social ties among group members of 160 groups from the Microfund for Women in Jordan. The 
survey questions are in the appendix of this thesis. The survey data are used to show if group 
lending mitigates asymmetry of information and enforcement problems faced by lenders.  
In specific, chapter 2 uses the data to investigate whether group members improve 
repayment performance through their group-wise actions of screening, monitoring, contract 
enforcement, and the use of social ties among each others. In doing so, we abide with the theoretical 
work that assumes all group members work together to ensure good repayment performance.  
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In most group lending programs, group members of a borrowing group select a group leader 
after the group is formed. The data allows us to investigate whether the effectiveness of joint 
liability, screening and enforcement activities and the use of social ties effects on repayment 
performance differ across different group members. In particular, chapter 3 analyzes whether the 
provision of these activities and their effect on repayment performance differ between the group 

























   
Chapter 2 
 




In the last couple of decades, a growing range of financial institutions have developed an 
alternative lending mechanism that has turned around the conventional wisdom that lending to poor 
households is doomed to failure.3  Microfinance institutions (MFIs) as these are called share a 
commitment to providing poor households with very small loans to assist them start productive 
activities or grow their current small businesses. MFIs extend credit to poor household through 
innovative use of information that potential borrowers may have about each other resulting in high 
repayment rates.  The hope is that much poverty can be mitigated by extending credit and financial 
services to poor households.  
In most developing countries poor households usually have no access to the formal banking 
system. The formal banking system has three major problems in extending credit to such borrowers: 
inability to assess the risk type of potential borrowers (screening), to ensure that the loan, once 
made, is utilized productively (monitoring) and to ensure the repayment of loans if borrowers are 
reluctant to do so (enforcement). Note first that the poor in general cannot meet the collateral 
requirements stipulated by the banks. Second, the inherently high cost to banks of screening and 
monitoring the actions of the poor and to enforce contracts may all contribute to the exclusion of 
the poor from the credit market.  
MFIs primarily follow a specific format for extending credit to the poor − they lend to a self-
selected group of entrepreneurs who are jointly liable for a loan. Since group members are jointly 
                                                 
3 Among these pioneer financial institutions are the Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, BancoSol of Bolivia, and the Bank of 
Rakyat Indonesia where the repayment rates in these institutions are above 95%. See Morduch (1999) for a review of 
these microfinance institutions.  
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liable for a loan, group lending creates incentives for individual group members to screen out risky 
borrowers, monitor each others’ actions and enforce repayment. Essentially, by replacing physical 
collateral with a form of social collateral, it considerably lowers the cost of the loan for the lender.  
The borrowers have more information about each other and hence can successfully solve the 
asymmetric information problem that plagues the lenders. 
While a host of theoretical explanations exist to account for the success of group lending 
programs, empirical research has lagged behind. In an attempt to fill the gap between the theoretical 
and empirical research, this paper examines the significance of screening, monitoring, group 
pressure, and social ties on borrower group performance. The data was obtained by the researchers 
through a survey of 160 groups carried out in cooperation with the Microfund for Women (MFW), 
a group lending institution in Jordan.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature in 
group lending, while section 2.3 provides an overview of microfinance in Jordan as well as a 
description of the group lending methodology of the MFW. Section 2.4 describes the data collection 
process and the variable construction. In section 2.5 empirical results are presented with section 2.6 
containing some concluding remarks. 
2.2 Review of the Related Literature 
 
The literature on group lending is quite substantial. Here we provide a brief overview of 
some of the theoretical papers. The last part of this review examines the small but growing number 
of empirical papers on this topic. 
Credit rationing and collateral requirements are primarily responsible for the exclusion of 
poor borrowers from the credit market. As shown in the seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
liberalizing interest rates, or using collateral requirements to loosen credit rationing results in adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. By definition the poor have limited supplies of tangible assets. 
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Their likely failure to meet collateral requirements makes the lenders’ job of screening the poor 
borrowers a difficult mission. One innovation to extend credit to the poor that simultaneously 
addresses the asymmetric information problem and enforcement concerns lies in group lending; 
lending to self-selected groups of entrepreneurs who are jointly liable for a loan. Groups form 
voluntarily, and, while loans are made to individual in the group, all members of the group are held 
responsible for loan repayment by the entire group. Many theoretical papers have stressed group 
lending’s informational and enforcement advantages over individual lending. Since group members 
are jointly liable for loan repayment, group lending can achieve better screening to dilute adverse 
selection, induces peer monitoring to contend moral hazard and provides group members with 
incentives to enforce loan repayments (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999).4  
Ghatak (1999) and Van Tassel (1999) are representatives of models that explore the adverse 
selection problem. They show how group lending can take advantage of the “inside” information 
that only borrowers have about each other, to draw in relatively safer borrowers. As a result 
repayment rates and efficiency are higher under group lending than individual lending (Ghatak 
1999).5  
Another strand of papers focuses on monitoring and moral hazard issues under group 
lending. Varian (1990) analyzed how borrowers mutually monitor each others’ projects to ensure the 
success of financed projects and how monitoring reduces some of the barriers and information 
asymmetry between the lender and the borrower. Stiglitz (1990) shows that group lending, via 
monitoring, alleviates the moral hazard issues involved in lending to those with no collateral. 
Stiglitz’s model shows how group lending can increase the choice of safer projects by inducing a 
borrower to encourage a partner to choose a safer project. Banerjee, Besely, and Guinnane (1994) 
                                                 
4 This exhaustive survey also provides an excellent introduction to the theory and practice of group lending. 
 
5 If group members do not have complete information about each other, then group lending may not lead to any 
improvements in loan repayment rates. This has also been shown in Laffont and N’Guessan (2000). 
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show that the burden of moral hazard problem between a borrowing member and the lender falls on 
the monitoring members who are responsible for repaying the loan of the defaulting member. They 
show that with an increasing cost of monitoring, a monitor can impose higher penalties on the 
borrowing member in the case of default, giving the borrowing member an incentive to choose a 
safer project.    
Another set of theoretical papers focus on the strategic default strategies of group members. 
In the Besely and Coate (1995) model borrowers choose whether to repay or not after realizing 
projects returns by comparing the repayment amount with the severity of the official penalties 
imposed by the lender, and the unofficial penalties imposed by the other group members and the 
community. They show that group lending can improve repayment rates relative to individual 
lending given that social penalties are strong enough. Aghion (1999) argues that monitoring and the 
threat of social sanctions can prevent strategic default in group lending. In this model, a borrower 
can verify her partner’s true project returns at some cost and inflict sanction upon default. I now 
move on to the empirical part of this research. 
On of the earliest empirical papers by Wenner (1995) used data from 25 Foundation for 
International Community Assistance (FINCA) credit groups in Costa Rica to study group lending as 
a means of transmitting information on borrower creditworthiness. The relationship between 
repayment rates and explanatory variables was examined internally, that is between members and the 
credit group and then externally, between the group as a whole and FINCA, the credit institution. 
Wenner found that groups that screened on the basis of an internal written code of regulations had 
better internal as well as external repayment rates than those that did not. Also, groups that lived in 
better off towns in terms of infrastructure had worse repayment performance indicating that those 
groups may have alternative credit sources and value the FINCA services less.    
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Around the same time in another paper Sharma and Zeller (1996) investigated the 
determinants of repayment performance of 128 credit groups belonging to three group-based credit 
programs in Bangladesh. Their main findings include the significance of the effect of risk 
diversification, credit rationing, screening, and social ties on repayment performance. They found 
that high degree of credit rationing and unfulfilled credit demand, improves repayment performance 
since it generates incentives for protecting higher expected credit in the future. However, higher 
degree of credit rationing which renders the loan size trivial worsens repayment.  Not surprisingly, 
groups formed endogenously, where screening is assumed to be more effective, were found to have 
better repayment rates relative to groups formed by credit institutions. Social ties, measured as the 
proportion of relative members in the group, has a negative impact on repayment supporting the 
hypothesis that it might be difficult to impose sanctions on relatives, which dilutes the enforcement 
process. Among other results, Sharma and Zeller also found that repayment rates are negatively 
associated with larger loan sizes.   
Zeller (1998) which combines features of both Wenner (1995) and Sharma and Zeller (1996) 
investigated the effect of intragroup risk pooling and social cohesion on the repayment rate. The 
data used by Zeller was obtained from a random sample of 146 groups from six different group 
lending programs in Madagascar. While most Malagasy households grow rice in irrigated lowlands, 
rainfed uplands constitute more than half of the total landholdings in the sample household. Returns 
from uplands are highly variable while returns from irrigated lowlands are stable making uplands a 
risky asset while irrigated lowland a safe one. Intragroup risk pooling, the degree by which group 
members diversify the group’s joint portfolio of assets, is measured by the coefficient of variation of 
upland possessed by members of the same group. Zeller’s results showed that repayment rate 
increases with more diversification of the group’s joint asset portfolio. However, there is an optimal 
point of risk pooling after which increased diversification leads to lower repayment rate because of 
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higher cost of monitoring. Therefore, the hypothesis that groups consisting of members with 
homogeneous risk exposure have higher repayment rates was rejected. Social cohesion, measured by 
counting the number of common characteristics among group members like social class, ethnicity, 
neighborhood, friendship and kinship, is found to improve the repayment rate.  
Wydick (1999) analyzed the effect of peer monitoring, social ties, and group pressure on the 
provision of intra-group insurance, the mitigation of moral hazard within borrowing groups, and the 
group repayment performance. Using a sample of 137 borrowing groups of the Fundo Para o 
Desenvolvimento de Atividades Porturias from in and around the rural towns of Quetzaltenango 
and Totonicapan in Guatemala, Wydick’s empirical results show that social ties have no effect in 
mitigating moral hazard within a borrowing group. They have a small effect on providing intra 
group insurance, and have no effect in improving repayment rates. Group pressure within groups 
exerts a significant effect in mitigating moral hazard, has a modest effect on the provision of intra 
group insurance, and has no effect on repayment rate. The empirical results show that peer 
monitoring is a primary factor in affecting group performance in terms of providing intra group 
insurance, mitigating moral hazard, and improving repayment rates. It is only peer monitoring that 
has a direct effect repayment rates. Repayment rates are improved through different channels in 
urban versus rural areas. In urban areas, repayments rates are improved through the stimulation of 
intra group insurance via more intensive peer monitoring. In rural areas, groups enforce repayment 
by deterring moral hazard through willingness to apply social pressure. 
More recently, Godquin (2002) tested the explanatory power of social ties, group 
homogeneity, social intermediation, dynamic incentives and loan characteristics (loan size and loan 
duration) on group’s repayment performance. Godquin used 1629 loan observations of borrowers 
from the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, and Bangladesh Rural 
Development Board from Bangladesh. Two repayment measures were used: repayment on time with 
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a grace period of three months was used in the whole sample and repayment on time was used in 
the split sample (one regression per MFI). Godquin found that the effect of social ties within group 
members on repayment is negative while the effect of social ties of group members out of the group 
is positive. Social intermediation and group homogeneity in terms of sex, education and age have no 
significant impact on repayment in the whole sample. In the split sample, social intermediation and 
group homogeneity showed mixed effects on repayment. Credit rationing, a measure of dynamic 
incentive, showed a positive effect on repayment in the split sample. Group size had a positive 
impact on repayment on time. While the loan size showed a negative impact on repayment before 
instrumentation, the instrumented size of the loan presented a positive impact.  
In a comprehensive paper Ahlin and Townsend (2005; henceforth AT) develop and test the 
implications of four representative models of joint liability lending. Two of these models: Stiglitz 
(1990) and Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994; henceforth BBG) highlight moral hazard 
problems that can be mitigated through joint liability lending and monitoring. The third one, Besely 
and Coate (1995; henceforth BC) relates strategic default or limited enforcement model. The lender 
cannot fully enforce repayment and borrowers decide whether or not to repay by comparing the 
repayment amount with the severity of penalties imposed by the lender and the community. The 
fourth model to be tested is Ghatak (1999) which describes how the joint liability contracts can 
partially overcome the adverse selection problem. AT examined both the predictions of variables 
already included in these models, and predictions of additional variables they introduced in a general 
way. AT introduced the loan size in the BBG’s model, productivity in all four models, correlation of 
borrower output in Stiglitz, BC and Ghatak models, the degree of cooperation in the Stiglitz, BBG, 
and BC models, the availability of outside credit in both the Stiglitz and BBG models. Variables 
considered in some or all models or introduced by AT include interest rate, loan size, liability 
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payment, borrower productivity, screening ability, the ease of monitoring, the degree of cooperation, 
the availability of outside credit, and penalties for default. 
The data used to test predictions regarding the determinants of the group repayment rate are 
from large cross section survey of 192 villages in Thailand conducted in 1997. The survey covers 
two contrasting regions; one enjoys a degree of industrialization and fertile land for farming; and the 
other is poorer and semi-arid. The survey data is from 262 joint liability groups of the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative and from 2880 households of the same villages. 
Nonparametric, univariate tests and multivariate logits methods were used to study the predictions 
of the models for repayment. 
AT found that the joint liability payment amount has a negative effect on repayment rate 
which favors the Stiglitz and Ghatak models over BBG’s. This finding supports the fact that higher 
joint liability amount under ceteris paribus conditions acts as an additional tax on success, since only 
the successful borrowers pay it. Due to insufficient variation and potential endogeneity problems, no 
attempt was made to establish a relationship between interest rate and repayment rate and loan size 
and repayment rate. However, they find evidence that is in line with Ghatak’s inverted-U shape 
relationship between repayment rate and loan size. Education, a measure of productivity, improves 
repayment performance. This favors all four models. Their data does not reveal screening as a 
significant determinant of good repayment as predicted by Ghatak. Favoring the Stiglitz and Ghatak 
models, the covariance of output has a positive effect on repayment. The cost of monitoring 
variables show mixed results.  
In the nonparametric comparisons and the fixed effects logit, the higher the percentage of 
group members living in the same village, the better was their repayment performance. On the other 
hand, the results show that the higher the percentage of relatives in the group, the lower the 
repayment. The first result favors BBG’s model while the second contradicts it. Default penalties 
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show positive and significant effect on repayment which are in line with the BC model’s predictions. 
Outside credit options, the availability of village-run savings and loan institutions, are negatively and 
significantly associated with repayment performance. This finding is in line with the Stiglitz and 
BBG models. Finally, AT found that cooperation tends to worsen repayment rates favoring the 
BBG and BC models over the Stiglitz’s story. AT conclude that social structure that disables 
penalties can be harmful for repayment. 




The history of microfinance in Jordan has begun with the public sector provision of 
subsidized credit in 1959 by the Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC). The ACC was founded for 
the purpose of providing loans, including micro loans, for the development of the agricultural 
sector. The first manifest microlending program was founded in 1965 by the Industrial 
Development Bank. Numerous microenterprise foundations were subsequently established: the 
Orphan’s Fund in 1972, the Noor Al-Husain Foundation in 1985, the General Union of Voluntary 
Societies in 1986, the Near East Foundation and the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development (and Enterprise Development) in 1990, the Development and Employment Fund in 
1992,  and the UNRWA Microenterprise Credit Programme in 2002. A new government sponsored 
bank − the National Bank for Financing Small Projects, known as the “Bank of the Poor”, is 
currently underway and is expected to provide subsidized credit. However, the client base, the 
market influence, and the subsidized credit available to the public sector microcredit programs have 
been declining over the last several years. Instead a number of privately owned MFIs that engage in 
sustainable financing have stepped in to fill this gap. 
The concept of sustainable microfinance was introduced in Jordan by the Save the Children 
in 1994, when they launched the Group Guaranteed Lending and Savings Programs (GGL). 
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Encouraged by this success, a separate legal entity (the Jordanian Women’s Development Society) 
was established in 1996, which commenced operations and subsequently became the Microfund for 
Women (MFW) in 1999. Soon after, three other microfinance institutions (MFIs) were also 
established: Jordan Micro Credit Company (JMCC) in 1999, Ahli Microfinancing Company (AMC) 
in 1999, and the Middle East Micro Credit Company (MEMCC) through the Cooperative Housing 
Foundation in 1998. Support for the sustainable microfinance industry in Jordan is primarily 
provided by the Access to Microfinance and Improved Implementation of Policy Reform (AMIR). 
The AMIR program is an innovative economic opportunity project funded by USAID and 
implemented in partnership with the Jordanian private sector and government. 6  
Although subsidized microcredit providers have a significantly higher share of the total 
amount of credit disbursed to microentrepreneurs, the newly established MFIs have a higher share 
of the total number of borrowers, close to 80%. A credit demand study in 2002 (AMIR Report, 
2002) estimated the potential demand for microcredit at JD 220 million (JD 1 = $ 1.4). Based on 
effective demand, or ability to pay, the demand for microcredit was estimated at JD 86 million 
concentrated in urban areas and registered businesses. According to this study, the MFIs can 
potentially capture 90% of the market. As of March 2004, the four MFIs together were serving 
almost 17,000 clients for an outstanding portfolio of almost JD 9.7 million. We now proceed to 
discuss the largest of these MFIs which is also the data source for this study. 
2.3.2 Microfund for Women 
 
The Microfund for Women (MFW) is registered as a non-profit limited liability company 
with the Ministry of Industry and Trade since October 1999, and has a headquarter office and 9 
                                                 
6 Along with technical assistance from AMIR, these four MFIs have achieved operational and financial self sufficiency 
by charging an interest rate that covers all costs. Operational self sufficiency is achieved by covering all administrative 
costs and loan losses from operating income while financial self sufficiency is achieved by coving all administrative costs, 
loan losses, and financing costs from operating income after adjusting for inflation and treating all funding as if it had a 
commercial cost (Charitonenko and Kristalsky, 2004). 
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branch offices serving major cities in Northern and Central Jordan. Initially, the MFW exclusively 
targeted low-income female clients with the vast majority of clients living in urban areas.7 The MFW 
offers three types of loans: group loans, individual loans and seasonal loans. Individual and seasonal 
loans are approved and supervised by the headquarters while group loans are approved and 
supervised by branch offices. Since our focus is on group loans, a description of their group loan 
program is provided in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Description of Group Loans at the MFW 
 
Loan Type Group Loans 
Creation Date 1996 
Client Type Urban 
Collateral Requirements Group guarantee 
Repayment Schedule Bi-weekly, monthly 
Nominal annualized interest rate (first loan) 21% flat 
Additional Fees (JD) 5 
Loan Size Range (JD) 200-500 
Average Loan Size (JD) 320 
Loan Term range 28 weeks, 8 months 
 
The Group Guaranteed Lending Product (GGL) offered by MFW utilizes the group lending 
methodology − individual borrowers themselves form a group that jointly guarantees the loan given 
to the group. The group members must know each other and respect the loan size caps by cycle and 
within groups, members may not be business partners or from the same family. The required group 
size is between 4-6 members, and the group loans on average, range between JD200 and JD500 per 
borrower. The initial loan size for all new members is on average JD200. The groups have the 
choice to make their repayments either in bi-weekly or monthly installments.  
The MFW holds two basic meetings with the borrowing groups, one to fill initial forms and 
discuss policies, and the second to define group members’ roles (leader and treasurer) and to review 
the loan contract orally. In the disbursement meeting at the MFW branch, clients are reminded of 
the contract policies. The group leader is appointed by the group members and functions as an 
                                                 
7 Over the past three years, however, it has been expanding to include more registered businesses and even men, with 
the limitation that male borrowers cannot exceed 20% of the total client base. 
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intermediary between the group members and the loan officers. The group leader and the treasurer 
keep the accounts of the group, collect the installment payments from the group members and 
transfer these installments to the MFW designated partner bank. Being a group leader or treasurer 
does not generate any financial privileges.  
To discourage delinquency, a late penalty of 3 JD per day, payable on the next payment date 
or at the end of the loan term are imposed. Delinquent cases are referred to court after 21 days.8  As 
of March 2004, MFW was serving 10,720 clients for an outstanding portfolio of JD 2.5 million. 
Since its inception, the MFW has been successful in maintaining repayment rates above 98 percent 
in its group loans.  
2.4 The Data Collection Process and Variable Description 
 
2.4.1 The Data 
 
During the months of February through May of 2005 I carried out a survey of 160 randomly 
selected borrowing groups of the MFW in Jordan. The survey covered two provinces, Irbid (north 
Jordan) and Al-Rusaifa (central-north Jordan). These two provinces were chosen due to financial 
and time constraints. Data on the loan size, the number of continuing, old, and new members in 
each group, and loan application dates were obtained from the MFW’s data base. Also obtained 
from the MFW’s data base were the number of installments, the due amount of installments, the due 
dates of repayment, the actual repayment amounts, and the repayment dates for each group. In Irbid 
the branch office, 84 groups were surveyed while in Al-Rusaifa the survey covered 76 groups. The 
survey was administered to group leaders as they walked in into these branches for loan transaction 
related matters. Sitting at the MFW branch office and waiting for a group leader to show up 
guaranteed that each possible group leader had the same probability of being selected in the sample. 
                                                 
8 There were approximately 23 delinquent cases in court proceedings for the periods 2003 and 2004. 
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Three group leaders out of 163 refused to provide answers to the questionnaire. The survey took 
approximately 3 months while it took 3 weeks to obtain the data from the MFW branches. 
2.4.2 Variable Description 
 
2.4.2.1 Dependents Variables 
 
We use two measures of repayment. Data on repayment were obtained from the MFW data 
base. Our first measure of repayment, Delinquency, is a binary dummy which equals one if a group 
had at least one late repayment, and zero if the group paid all installments on time up until the 
survey interview took place. The second measure of repayment is the sum of late days of repayment 
for each group up until the survey interview took place. We call this measure Delinquency Intensity. 
This measure gives a better idea of the overall repayment performance of the borrowing groups.  
 2.4.2.2  Independent Variables 
 In this section we divide the independent variables into five groups; control variables, 
screening variables, monitoring variables, social ties variables, and group pressure variables. 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are provided in Table 2.2. 
Control Variables 
 
At the time of the survey, different groups had different starting dates of receiving loans and 
therefore were at different stages of repayment. Time span of repayment performance is therefore 
not symmetric, with some groups having only one month of repayment history and other groups 
having eight months. When the interviews were conducted, 48 percent of the groups had repaid 
their installments on time (mean and median of repayment history during the current cycle are 5.96 
and 8 months respectively).9 Actual repayment rate at the end of the cycle is considerably higher, i.e., 
while late repayment is common, default is not. On average, each group has 3 days of late 
                                                 




   
repayment. The MFW charges a fixed amount of 3 JD per late day which is the first remedial action 
taken against groups that fail to repay on time.  
The explanatory variables used are summarized in Table 2.2. Rephist measure how far along a 
group is in its current loan cycle. If repayment occurs with some probability p each month, then 
groups with a longer history are more likely to have late repayment. Toward the end of the cycle, 
however, groups are expected to improve their repayment performance to be eligible for another 
loan cycle. Therefore, the effect of repayment history is a non-linear. Thus the log of repayment 
history (lnRephist) will be considered in the empirical analysis.  
Stiglitz (1990) assumed that the expected utility of a risky project increases faster in loan size 
than that of a safe project. This assumption guarantees that risky projects become relatively more 
attractive as loan size increases. By introducing loan size in the BBG (1994) model, Ahlin and 
Townsend (2005), conclude that higher loan has two opposite effects. Higher loan size increases the 
monitor’s liability and thus his incentive to monitoring. It also increases the expected interest cost to 
the borrower more than his expected output inducing him to choose riskier projects. They also 
introduce loan size in Ghatak’s (1999) model and find a similar contradictory effect. In our study, 
Loansize measures the group loan size in hundreds of JD. Following Ahlin and Townsend (2005), we 
consider the Loansize and it is square Loansizesq.  
Ahlin and Townsend (2005) showed that Stiglitz (1990), BBG (1994), BC (1995), and 
Ghatak (1999) predict that higher borrower productivity increases repayment rate. Group leaders 
were asked to classify each group member into one of 6 categories: whether the member can read, 
have elementary schooling, preliminary schooling, high schooling, two year college, or four year 
college. Values from 1 to 6 were assigned to these different levels of education. The average 
educational attainment is close to 3 which corresponds to 9 years of actual schooling. Our measure 
of Productivity, Education, is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a group has an average 
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educational attainment of 4 or above. This measure allows us to directly compare the repayment 
performance of groups with higher education to groups with lower education. 
Table 2.2: Variables Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev 
Dependent Variables 
Delinquency Dummy = 1 if the group had at least one late repayment up to 








Rephist Number of repayments made or supposed to be made by the 
group during the current loan cycle 
5.962 2.479 
Loansize Group loan size in hundreds of JD 15.76 4.19 
Education Dummy = 1 if the group has an average education of 4 and above 0.112 0.316 
Branch Dummy = 1 if the group belongs to Al-Rusaifa Branch  0.475 0.500 
Land The mean of the size of land owned by the group measured in 
hundreds of square meters 
4.304 10.569 
Religion Percentage of groups who pray five times a day 0.867 0.215 
Groupage Number of years since the group took its first loan 4.037 2.571 
Outside Credit 
Croption Percentage of members with access to credit from individual 
outside the group 
0.246 0.348 
Screening 
Screen Dummy = 1 if the group members rejected a borrower who would 
like to join them  
0.568 0.496 
Knowtype Dummy = 1 if the group members know the quality of each 
others’ work  
0.950 0.218 
Monitoring 
Samebus The Probability that two members have same occupation 0.156 0.175 
Relative Percentage of relatives in groups 0.227 0.294 
Phone The percentage of group members with access to either land or 
cell phone services. 
0.646 0.287 
Group Pressure 
Pressure An index of group pressure from 0 to 5 3.881 0.856 
Coop1 An Index of cooperation between non-relatives from 0 to 6 3.193 1.348 
Coop2 An Index of cooperation between relatives from 0 to 6 1.356 1.816 
Social ties 
Socialties An index of social ties from 0 to 6 5.381 1.273 
 
Both Stiglitz (1991) and BBG (1994) have predictions on the effect of outside borrowing 
options on repayment rates. Groups with more outside borrowing options will have a higher loan 
size (from the primary lender and other outside options) giving group members greater incentive for 
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risky projects. Our measure of outside borrowing options, Croption, is the percentage of group 
members who have access to credit from individuals outside the group.10  
To capture any differences in the repayment behavior of borrowing groups across the two 
branches surveyed, we include a dummy variable equals to one if the group belongs to Al-Rusaifa’s 
Branch. We call this variable Branch.  
While the MFW does not require assets ownership by the borrowing groups, such wealth 
indicators may improve the capacity of the groups to meet repayment requirements on time. We use 
land ownership to capture the wealth effect on repayment behavior. Land, measured in hundreds of 
square meters, is the mean land size owned by the group.   
Cultural factors, like religion, may also affect the repayment performance of groups. All 
group members interviewed in the sample were Muslims. We attempt to measure religion intensity 
across groups by considering the percentage of group members who pray five times a day. We call 
this variable Religion.   
Group age, called Groupage, is the number of years since the different groups took their first 
group loan. If each loan cycle increases the credit value to the borrowing groups, then one would 
expect the repayment performance to improve at each successive loan cycle. But if groups envision 
their relationship with the lending program as transitory, then the repayment performance will 
worsen for later loan cycles. Group age also can be a proxy for experience. The expected sign of 
Groupage is therefore ambiguous.  
Screening Variables 
 
Ghatak (1999) and Van Tassel (1999) develop models where group lending, via screening, 
can mitigate problems created by adverse selection. The key is that group formation displays positive 
                                                 
10 We prefer to use outside credit options from individuals outside the group rather than from commercial banks.  This 
is because such loans are harder to obtain and group leaders were not confident of their response to this question.    
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assortative matching under group lending schemes. Our measure for screening, Screen, is a dummy 
that equals one if the group has ever rejected a borrower who would like to join the group. In 
adverse selection models, and as necessary prerequisite for screening to function, borrowers are 
assumed to know each other’s type in terms of risk. To capture this we use a dummy variable, 
Knowtype, that takes a value of one if members know the quality and sales of each other’s occupation.  
Monitoring Variables 
 
Armendariz and Beatriz (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Banerjee, Besley, and 
Guinnane (1994) presented models in which peer monitoring mitigates moral hazard behavior of 
individual group members. Stiglitz (1990), in another peer monitoring model, deduce that the 
repayment performance in group lending programs is positively related to the members’ 
homogeneity with respect to their projects’ riskiness. Cost of monitoring is measured using different 
proxies. Samebus is the group occupational homogeneity. It is the probability that two chosen group 
members have the same occupation. The more homogeneous the group is, the easier to monitor. 
Based on the MFW 2003 annual report, the sector distribution of the MFW clients’ enterprises 
during 2003 is as the following: 67% trade, 19% handicrafts, 7 % production and manufacturing, 5 
% services, and 2% agriculture and live stock. Similar distribution was obtained from the survey 
data. Namely, 65.9% of the group members are involved in trade, 21.7% in handicraft, 5.8% in 
production and manufacturing, 4% in services, and 2.6% in agriculture and live stock. The majority 
of the empirical literature focuses on areas where the agricultural sector is the dominant, (Ahlin and 
Townsend (2005), Sharma and Zeller (1996), and Zeller (1998)). These studies focus on the risk 
pooling characteristic of occupational homogeneity while we focus on the cost of monitoring one. 
While it is easy to justify the correlation in output in the agricultural sector, it is more challenging to 
justify it in other sectors like trade. Group members with the same line of trade business (clothes 
trade, for example) may yet have different returns.  
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The second measure of cost of monitoring, Relative, is the percentage of members in the 
groups that are related to each other. Due to higher flow of information among relatives, the higher 
the percentage of relatives is, the easier to monitor and therefore the less moral hazard. Models like 
BBG (1994) relate monitoring to imposing penalties. Therefore, while it might be easier for a group 
member to monitor her relative partner in the group, it might be difficult to impose penalties on her 
as well.  
We also attempt to measure the cost of monitoring by looking at the percentage of group 
members who have phone services. The hypothesis here is that the higher the percentage of 
members with phone services, the easier the flow of information and therefore monitoring. Phone 
measures the percentage of members in a group that have access to either land or cell phone 
services.   
Group Pressure Variables 
 
Besely and Coate (1995) stressed the importance of group pressure against defaulting 
members to reduce moral hazard in a borrowing group. A related argument by Wydick (1996) shows 
that once sufficiently strong and credible threats of social sanctions against a defaulting group 
member exist, group lending will be able to deter moral hazard. In the empirical analysis, a similar, 
but not identical structure used by Wydick (1999) is utilized to measure group pressure among group 
members. Group pressure Pressure is measured by utilizing five yes/no questions asked to group 
leaders: whether group members are willing to practice pressure against another group member late 
in repaying, whether the group feels that practicing such pressure is difficult, whether group 
members feel moral to repay group loan, whether group members repay to stay on good terms with 
each other, and whether the group has an internal code to punish a defaulting group member. 
Pressure is thus an index equal to the number of yes responses to these questions.  
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In Ahlin and Townsend (2005) modification of Stiglitz (1990), BBG (1994) and BC (1995) 
showed that these models contain predictions on the effect of cooperation on repayment rates. 
Cooperation in Stiglitz’s model enables the group to jointly choose the type of project. This in turn 
circumvents free-riding of one member on his partner’s safe behavior which improves repayment. In 
BBG model, group members who prefer safe behavior in non-cooperative groups will be willing to 
exert cheap penalties on other members who prefer risky behavior while cooperative groups will not 
be willing to do so. Cooperation in BBG model therefore reduces repayment. As in BBG, BC model 
predicts that cooperation decreases repayment. When groups behave cooperatively, borrowers 
commit ex ante not to use penalties against borrower i if borrower i’s cost of repaying exceeds 
borrower j’s benefit from a non-delinquent i, and vice versa. When groups behave non-
cooperatively, groups cannot commit not to impose penalties, and the borrower who realizes higher 
output will use penalties against a low output borrower to force repayment ex post even if the cost 
to the low output borrower is higher than the benefit to the high output borrower. In the empirical 
analysis, a similar, but not identical, structure by Ahlin and Townsend is utilized to measure 
cooperation among group members. Our measure of cooperation utilizes 6 yes/no questions asked 
to group leaders; whether cooperation to choose the place of business, referring customers to other 
group members, helping with free labor, helping with money, cooperation to purchase inputs, 
cooperation to sell output has occurred during the current cycle of lending. The index is the number 
of yes responses to these six questions. The same set of questions was asked twice regarding non-
related and related group members respectively. Coop1 therefore measures cooperation among non-
relatives and Coop2 measures cooperation among relatives within groups.   
Social Ties Variables 
 
Floro and Yotopolous (1991) showed that the success of group lending depends on its 
ability to harness social ties among borrowers to improve loan repayment. The importance of social 
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ties is explained in terms of the consequences of a group member default. Since default has a 
negative impact on other group members’ returns and future access to loans, and since borrowers 
are sensitive to their existing social network, borrowers will lessen their moral hazard behavior. 
Consequently, social ties between group members improve the group repayment performance. Our 
measure of social ties Socialties utilizes 6 yes/no questions asked to group leaders; whether she can 
get any type of help from other group members if needed, whether she can count on other group 
members to take care of her child if she is in need to go away for awhile, whether she has visited 
group members in the past week, whether she has had phone conversations with other group 
members in the past week, whether she seeks help from other group members to make a decision, 
whether she seeks mediation from others to solve a dispute with other group members. Socialties thus 
is an index equal to the number of yes responses to these six questions.  
2.5 Empirical Results 
 
The following empirical analysis uses heteroscedastic probit and negative binomial models to 
estimate the effects of a number of independent variables on group repayment performance, 
Delinquency and Delinquency Intensity. Our main hypotheses to be tested are the effect of screening, 
monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on groups’ repayment performance.  
We start by estimating a base model that includes our measures of screening, monitoring, 
group pressure, social ties and other control variables including repayment history, loan size, outside 
credit availability, and education. 
We then consequently add variables that may influence a group’s repayment performance:   a 
dummy variable to capture any difference in repayment behavior across the two branches surveyed, 
the mean size of land owned by the group, groups’ religion intensity, and the number of years since 




   
2.5.1 Probit Results 
 
The following empirical analysis uses a heteroscedastic probit model to estimate the effects 
of a number of independent variables on group repayment performance, Delinquency. The model 
allows the error term to vary according to the general formulation analyzed by Harvey (1976),  
( )( )22 '( ) expi iVar e zσ γ= =     (2.1) 
where  is a vector of variables that includes one or more of the independent variables and z γ  is a 
vector of coefficients. Denoting delinquency by 1y =  and no delinquency by , we model the 
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where is the normal distribution function, x is a vector of independent variables, and Φ β  is a 
vector of parameters. Maximum likelihood estimation of β  and γ  allows us to perform a likelihood 
ratio test for the hypothesis that 0γ = , a condition that corresponds to homoscedastic errors.11  
Equation 2 is estimated with defined to contain outside credit availability, Croption. z
Heteroscedastic probit results are shown in Table 2.3. The likelihood ratio tests reported at 
the bottom of the table and the t-values of the null hypothesis that 0γ =  reject any model without 
heteroscedasticity.     
Since the dependent variable involves late repayment at any time during the current loan 
cycle, then groups with longer history are more likely to have late repayment. From the baseline 
model, Model 1, the coefficient on lnrephist, the natural log of repayment history, is positive as 
                                                 
11 For an application of this test, see Knapp and Seaks (1992). 
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expected and statistically significant. Groups with longer history of repayment have higher 
probability of late repayment. This probability increases at a decreasing rate as shown by the positive 
sign on the coefficient of lnrephist. 
Table 2.3: Heteroscedastic Probit Regression Results 
 
Variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Constant -0.377 (-0.16) -0.180 (-0.08) -0.271 (-0.11) -0.622 (-0.24) -0.494 (-0.18) 
Control 
Lnrephist 4.712 (4.42)*** 5.112 (4.33)*** 5.130 (4.22)*** 5.207 (4.14)*** 5.840 (3.92)*** 
Loansize 0.448 (1.68)* 0.446 (1.64)* 0.451 (1.65)* 0.446 (1.63)* 0.381 (1.31) 
Loansizesq -0.013 (-1.72)* -0.013 (-1.66)* -0.012 (-1.65)* -0.012 (-1.63)* -0.012 (-1.45) 
Education 0.729 (1.23) 0.747 (1.22) 0.989 (1.42) 0.982 (1.40) 1.224 (1.67)* 
Branch  -0.419 (-1.15) -0.466 (-1.26) -0.467 (-1.25) -0.619 (-1.50) 
Land   -0.028 (-0.90) -0.026 (-0.85) -0.035 (-1.00) 
Religion    0.332 (0.36) 0.649 (0.65) 
Groupage     0.135 (1.71)* 
Outside Credit 
Croption 0.695 (0.89) 0.828 (0.96) 0.944 (1.05) 0.972 (1.05) 1.163 (1.05) 
Screening 
Screen -0.359 (-1.13) -0.441 (-1.31) -0.426 (-1.26) -0.448 (-1.29) -0.561 (-1.49) 
Knowtype -1.509 (-1.96)** -1.405 (-1.81)* -1.424 (-1.81)* -1.429 (-1.81)* -1.557 (-1.89)* 
Monitoring 
Samebus -0.661 (-0.79) -0.589 (-0.69) -0.580 (-0.68) -0.607 (-0.70) -0.517 (-0.58) 
Relative -3.724 (2.78)*** -3.934 (-2.84)*** -3.900 (-2.78)*** -3.909 (-2.79)*** -4.379 (-2.94)*** 
Cphone -0.634 (-1.04) -0.554 (-0.87) -0.604 (-0.94) -0.568 (-0.87) -0.509 (-0.74) 
Group Pressure 
Pressure -0.439 (-2.32)*** -0.506 (-2.48)*** -0.480 (-2.35)*** -0.462 (-2.21)** -0.546 (-2.46)*** 
Coop1 0.010 (0.07) -0.002 (-0.02) 0.024 (0.16) 0.015 (0.10) 0.050 (0.31) 
Coop2 0.655 (3.15)*** 0.678 (3.15)*** 0.686 (3.14)*** 0.694 (3.16)*** 0.771 (3.31)*** 
Social ties 




-71.0556 -70.3609 -69.9016 -69.8345 -68.2130 
Lnsigma2 
Croption (γ) 1.247 (2.43)*** 1.406 (2.61)*** 1.433 (2.63)*** 1.470 (2.60)*** 1.731 (2.65)*** 
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0 
Chi2(1) 8.09 9.46 9.80 9.94 11.96 
p-value 0.0045 0.0021 0.0017 0.0016 0.0005 
 
Notes: Delinquency = 1 if a group had at least one late repayment and zero if a group paid all 
installments on time. Numbers in Parentheses are t-values. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are 
denoted by *, **, *** respectively. 
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The signs on the loan size in our model suggest an inverted U relationship of delinquency 
with loan size.12 Statistically, the coefficients on loansize and loansizesq are significant at 10% level.13 
Our empirical results on loan size go in line with Sharma and Zeller (1996) finding but are contrary 
to what was found in Ahlin and Townsend (2005) and Godquin (2002).14  
In the Stiglitz (1990) model and in the Ahlin and Townsend extended model of BBG(1994), 
risky projects become relatively more attractive as loan size increases which enforces unwilling 
delinquency  to increase. While our results show evidence of this effect, they also show that a further 
increase in loan size reduces delinquency. A further increase in loan size of a group will also increase 
that group’s joint liability in case of default. Group members will therefore have more incentive to 
monitor each other and apply more group pressure on those members who show bad signs of 
repayment behavior. More monitoring and group pressure are expected to improve the repayment 
behavior of the individual group members.   
In Model 5, after controlling for branch, land, religion, and group age, Loansize and 
Loansizesq become statistically insignificant.  
Projects returns and therefore repayment are expected to be positively influenced by the 
productivity of the group. Our measure of Productivity, Education, is a dummy variable that is equal 
                                                 
12 Recall that our repayment measure is a dummy = 1 if a group had at least one late repayment and zero otherwise.  
 
13 Loansize can be endogenous. Lenders usually increase loan size over time to those groups with good past performance.  
We tested all models for endogeneity using the Smith-Blundell (1986) method using the percentage of new members in a 
group as an instrumental variable for the loan size. Endogeneity of the loans size was rejected in all models. The 
exogeneity of the loan size is not surprising given the dynamic incentives followed by the MFW and the structure of the 
borrowing groups. Group members are allowed to switch to their preferred groups at the beginning of each loan cycle 
and new borrowers may join old groups. New members start with small loan size of JD 200 and can go up to JD 500 
over time.  Therefore, old good performing groups may not be associated with total larger group loans if there are new 
members joining these groups. For example, a group of four in their, say, fifth loan cycle, may have a total loan size of 
JD 2000, 500 each. If, at the beginning of their sixth cycle, one member of this group switches to another group and a 
new member joins this group, then the total loan size of this group would be JD 1700, 500 for each old member and 200 
for the new member.  
 
14 The instrumented size of the loan in Godquin paper presented a positive impact on repayment that is contrary to what 
was found before instrumentation.  
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to 1 if a group has an average educational attainment of 4 or above. Surprisingly, Education is 
insignificant in all models but the last one. In Model 5, after controlling for branch, land, religion, 
and group age, Education still unexpectedly positive. That is, groups with high level of education have 
higher probability of late repayment relative to those of low education.15 The empirical literature on 
the effect of education on repayment found mixed results. Ahlin and Townsend (2005) found that 
more productive groups, in terms of education, have better repayment performance. Zeller (1998) 
using literacy as a measure of human capital found that the coefficient on literacy is not statistically 
different from zero. Godquin (2002) found that education worsens repayment in the whole sample 
but has no effect on the split samples.  
An explanation of this may lie on the fact that the highly educated groups are less credit 
rationed. The MFW typically begins by lending groups small amounts and then increasing loan size 
for these groups with satisfactory repayment. If a group faces a high degree of credit rationing it 
implies that this group has unfulfilled credit demand. In the survey, almost 96% of the group leaders 
expressed their willingness to borrow larger loans at the current interest rate. In order to protect 
future larger loans, groups with higher unfulfilled credit demand will be expected to increase their 
efforts to improve repayment performance. In the survey, we asked the group leaders about their 
desired loan sizes. We also have the group leaders’ actual loan sizes from the MFW’s data base. 
These data allows us to measure the degree of credit rationing of the group leaders by taking the 
difference between the desired loan sizes and the actual ones expressed as a percent of the desired 
loan sizes. Assuming that the group leader and his partners are identically credit rationed, we found a 
negative and significant correlation between Education and credit rationing of -0.19 at the 1% level. 
That is, highly educated groups are associated with lower degree of credit rationing. Since these 
                                                 
15 Different measures of productivity like the mean and median of groups’ educational attainment yielded similar results.   
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groups face lower unfulfilled credit demand and less concerned about future larger loans, they are 
expected to exert less effort to improve their repayment performance.  
Both Stiglitz (1991) and BBG (1994) have predictions on the effect of outside borrowing 
options on repayment rates; groups with more outside borrowing options will experience higher 
loan size giving group members greater incentive for risky projects. The sign on Croption is as 
expected by theory but statistically insignificant under all specifications.  
The practice of screening is expected to crowd in safer type of borrowers which should improve 
repayment. The signs on the screening variables are negative as expected; screening reduces 
delinquency. While Screen has the expected sign in all models, it is not a significant predictor of late 
repayment. In adverse selection models and as a prerequisite for screening to take place, borrowers 
were assumed to know each other type. In all models, the sign on Knowtype is negative as expected 
and statistically significant. Borrowers’ knowledge about the quality and sales of each other 
occupations improves their group repayment performance. Similar results of the positive effect of 
screening on good repayment are also documented in Wenner (1995) and Sharma and Zeller (1996). 
With group lending, individual borrowers are liable for themselves and for others in their 
group, therefore, they have incentives to monitor each others’ actions. The signs of the coefficients 
on cost of monitoring measures are all negative as expected. More monitoring mitigates moral 
hazard and leads to lower delinquency. However, occupational homogeneity, samebus, and the 
percentage of group members with access to phone services, Phone, are not significant predictors of 
delinquency in all probit models. A similar measure of occupational homogeneity used by Ahlin and 
Townsed (2005) was also found to be a poor predictor of repayment.16 Relative measures the 
percentage of members in the group that are related to each other. The sign on the coefficient of 
Relative is negative and statistically significant under all specifications. Since the ease of information 
                                                 
16 Occupational homogeneity in Ahlin and Townsend was used as a measure of output correlation. The authors indicate 
that this measure can be used as a monitoring proxy.  
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flow, and therefore monitoring, is expected to be better among relatives, there would be less moral 
hazard and consequently lower delinquency. Ahlin and Townsend (2005) and Sharma and Zeller 
(1996) used similar measures to Relative. In these papers, however, the percentage of relatives on a 
group worsens repayment performance. Both papers argue that it is difficult to impose penalties on 
relatives which weaken the repayment enforcement process. Contrary to these papers, our results 
suggest that any difficulty in imposing penalties on relatives is overcome by the greater ease of 
monitoring relatives’ actions.  
Exercising pressure and imposing penalties against defaulting members mitigate moral 
hazard while cooperation among group members may dilute the willingness to exercise pressure and 
the imposition of penalties which encourages moral hazard. The signs of the coefficients on all 
group pressure measures give an evidence of this statement. In all models, the sign on Pressure is 
negative and statistically significant indicating the importance of group pressure in alleviating moral 
hazard behavior of the borrowers. Similar results were found by Ahlin and Townsend (2005) and 
Wydick (1999). The signs on the cooperation measures are positive indicating that a greater degree 
of cooperation among group members increases the probability of delinquency. The signs and 
significance levels of cooperation measures are the same in all models. Cooperation among non-
relatives, Coop1, does not seem to be a strong predictor of delinquency as it is statistically 
insignificant. Cooperation among relatives, Coop2, however, has a strong positive predictive power 
on delinquency.  
The importance of social ties on repayment is explained in terms of the consequences of a 
group member’s default. Since default has a negative impact on other group members’ returns and 
future access to loans, and assuming that borrowers are sensitive to their existing social network, 
borrowers will lessen their moral hazard behavior. As expected, our measure of social ties, Socialties, 
shows a negative and strong impact on delinquency in all models. Our finding of the effect of 
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Socialties on repayment is contrary to Godquin (2002) results but in line with Zeller (1998). Relative, 
which can be viewed as a measure of social ties, goes in line with our finding that social ties reduces 
the probability of delinquency.  
In Models 2 through 5, we add new variables that are usually included in the empirical and 
theoretical literature on the determinants of delinquency. In Model 2, we try to capture any 
difference in repayment behavior of group borrowers across the two branches surveyed. The sign on 
Branch, which is a dummy variable equals to one if a group belongs to Al-Rusaifa’s branch, hold a 
negative sign in models 2 through 5. While the negative sign suggests that groups that belong to Al-
Rusaifa’s branch have lower probability of delinquency, such probability is statistically insignificant. 
In Model 3, we include Land, the mean size of land owned by a group. The sign on Land is 
negative as expected. Assets ownership improves the capacity of the groups to meet repayment 
requirements on time. However, this effect is statistically insignificant in Models 3 through 5.  
Next we include a measure of a cultural factor that may affect group repayment 
performance, Religion. In this model as well as in model 5, Religion is statistically insignificant.  
In Model 5, we include the group age, Groupage, the number of years since the group took its 
first loan. The sign and the statistical significance of Groupage suggest that groups may envision their 
relationship with the lending institution as transitory and therefore exert lower effort to repay on 
time on later loan cycles. In this model, loansize and loansizesq have the same signs as in the previous 
model, but the inclusion of Groupage renders them insignificant.  
2.5.2 Negative Binomial Results 
 
The following empirical analysis uses Negative Binomial estimation to test the effects of a 
number of independent variables on group repayment performance, Delinquency Intensity. The 
negative binomial model derives from a Poisson distribution. The Poisson has been suggested as the 
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benchmark model for count data (Cameron and Trevedi 1998). In the Poisson model iy  has mean 
( 'expi )ixμ β= and variance iμ , equal dispersion. That is; 
( ) ( ) ( )'x var x exp xi i i i i iE y yμ β= = =    (2.3) 
However, the conditional variance in most applications is greater than the conditional mean. While 
such overdispersion does not affect the poisson regression model estimates being consistent, such 
estimates are inefficient. The standard errors of the poisson regression model will be biased 
downward which will over estimate the significance of the explanatory variables (Long 1997). 
Overdispersion seems likely in our study because there are important explanatory variables 
that are difficult to capture (e.g., group members’ income, group members’ occupation risk level), 
and because error may exist in the estimates of some variables (pure randomness). Delinquency 
Intensity ranges in values between zero and 41. Approximately 85% of the sample takes values of 0, 1, 
2, 3, or 4. The mean of the number of days of late repayment is 3.1 days with a variance of 40.26. 
The raw data are therefore overdispersed and the inclusion of the regressors did not eliminate this 
overdispersion in Poisson regression model indicating its inadequacy of fit. If overdispersion exists, 
a Poisson model is not appropriate and a negative binomial model can be used instead.  
A negative binomial regression model includes a random error term iε  representing the 
effect of omitted explanatory variables or pure randomness. Therefore, equation 3 can be written as: 
( ) ( )'exp x expi i i i iμ β ε μ ε= + =%    (2.4) 
where ( )exp iε is a gamma distributed random variable with mean one and variance α . The 
negative binomial probability distribution is a mixture of Poisson distribution that allows the 
Poisson mean to be gamma distributed. The negative binomial distribution is given by: 
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where Γ is the gamma function. Equation 5 has a mean iμ  and variance 
( ) 2var xi iiy iμ αμ= +      (2.6) 
where α , the variance of the gamma-distributed error, is the overdispersion parameter. If 0α = , the 
negative binomial reduces to the Poisson distribution. The appropriateness of applying the Poisson 
model versus the negative binomial model can be assessed based on the statistical significance of 
estimate value ofα . 
We run similar models to those in Table 2.3.  Models 6 through 10 correspond to Models 1 
through 5 in Table 2.3 but with a different dependent variable. The dependent variable in the 
following analysis is the number of days late of repayment. Using the heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors, the negative binomial results are shown in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4 shows that there is a strong evidence of overdispersion. The dispersion parameter is 
positive and significant at the 1% level in all models. Alternatively, the computed likelihood ratio 
tests of overdispersion are even more highly significant.   
Similar to the probit estimations, the negative binomial estimations show that the coefficient 
on lnrephist is positive and statistically significant. That is, the longer the history of repayment, the 
more days of late repayments.  
The signs on the loan size in our model suggest an inverted U relationship of delinquency 
with loan size. Statistically, the coefficients on loansize and loansizesq are significant at 1% level in all 
models. Due to possible endogeniety in loan size in the negative binomial model, we give no 
interpretation on the effect of loan size on the number of days of late repayment.17
                                                 
17 Testing for endogeniety in negative binomial model is to be done later.  
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Table 2.4: Negative Binomial Results 
 
Variable Model 6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 
Constant -4.517 (-2.34)*** -4.395 (-2.49)*** -3.950 (-2.37)*** -2.874 (-1.74)* -3.070 (-1.81)* 
Control 
Lnrephist 4.754 (6.45)*** 4.876 (6.52)*** 4.923 (6.30)*** 4.775 (6.17)*** 4.720 (6.39)*** 
Loansize 0.782 (3.51)*** 0.795 (3.63)*** 0.759 (3.66)*** 0.707 (3.47)*** 0.741 (3.51)*** 
Loansizesq -0.0254 (-3.89)*** -0.025 (-4.02)*** -0.024 (-4.06)*** -0.022 (-3.83)*** -0.023 (-3.91)***
Education 0.642 (1.93)** 0.557 (1.68)* 0.815 (2.46)*** 0.856 (2.63)*** -0.703 (2.77)*** 
Branch  -0.509 (-1.73)* -0.606 (-1.95)** -0.668 (-2.16)** -0.703 (-2.30)** 
Land   -0.022 (-1.79)* -0.022 (-1.91)** -0.024 (-2.12)** 
Religion    -0.871 (-2.31)** -0.827 (-2.15)** 
Groupage     0.064 (1.36) 
Outside Credit 
Croption 0.644 (1.97)** 0.827 (2.35)*** 0.912 (2.58)*** 0.823 (2.34)*** 0.760 (2.13)** 
Screening 
Screen -0.003 (-0.02) -0.079 (-0.33) -0.055 (-0.23) -0.028 (-0.12) -0.015 (-0.07) 
Knowtype -1.103 (-1.59) -1.093 (-1.56) -1.256 (-1.77)* -1.144 (-1.61)* -1.159 (-1.77)* 
Monitoring 
Samebus -0.046 (-0.08) -0.052 (-0.09) 0.054 (0.09) 0.097 (0.17) 0.093 (0.16) 
Relative -2.015 (-2.45)*** -1.813 (-2.25)** -1.647 (-1.98)** -1.637 (-2.21)** -1.710 (-2.23)** 
Cphone -0.359 (-0.80) -0.373 (-0.82) -0.420 (-0.93) -0.523 (-1.18) -0.472 (-1.12) 
Group Pressure 
Pressure -0.358 (-2.78)*** -0.440 (-3.51)*** -0.483 (-3.74)*** -0.477 (-3.73)*** -0.513 (-3.89)***
Coop1 0.176 (1.83)* 0.174 (1.84)* 0.222 (2.22)** 0.219 (2.09)** 0.223 (2.16)** 
Coop2 0.297 (2.38)*** 0.255 (2.04)** 0.260 (2.06)** 0.223 (1.95)** 0.243 (2.06)** 
Social ties 




-277.5303 -2.75.7614 -2.74.7269 -2.73.4404 -2.72.5573 
α 1.255 (5.22)*** 1.216 (5.55)*** 1.198 (5.57)*** 1.125 (5.02)*** 1.102 (4.96)*** 
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0 
Chibar2(1) 251.98 253.11 255.12 199.20 198.58 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Delinquency Intensity: The number of late days of repayment. Numbers in Parentheses are t-
values. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are denoted by *, **, *** respectively. 
 
Under all models’ specifications, Education has an unexpected sing. That is, groups with 
higher level of education have more days of late repayment. As mentioned previously, highly 
educated group face lower credit constraints and are less concerned about future larger loans which 
give them less motivation to improve their repayment performance. The negative effect of education 
on good repayment has not been documented before. Ahlin and Townsend (2005) found that more 
productive groups, in terms of education, have better repayment performance. Zeller (1998) using 
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literacy as a measure of human capital found that the coefficient on literacy is not statistically 
different from zero. 
While the availability of outside borrowing options, Croptions, performs poorly in probit 
models, it gains predictive power in the negative binomial models with the positive expected sign. 
Groups with more outside borrowing opportunities experience higher loan size giving group 
members greater incentives for riskier projects and consequently more days of late repayment. One 
may also argue that groups with more alternative credit sources may value the MFW’s services less 
which leads to more days of late repayment (Wenner (1995)).    
The signs on the screening variables are negative as expected but lose predictive power in models 6 
and 7. In models 8 through 10, and after the consequent inclusion of land, religion, and group age, 
Knowtype turns significant at standard significance levels while Screen remains insignificant. Borrowers’ 
knowledge about the quality and sales of each others’ occupations seems to matter in reducing the 
number of days of late repayment. 
The performance of monitoring measures changes in the negative binomial models 
compared to the probit models. The sign on Samebus holds an unexpected sign in models 8 through 
10 but it is statistically insignificant, the performance of Relative is comparable to those in probit 
models, Phone has the expected sign but has no predictive power. Having more relatives in a group 
eases the process of monitoring and reduces the number of late repayment days.  
All the group pressure measures have the expected signs and have significant explanatory 
power on the number of days of late repayment in all the negative binomial models.  The results 
show that a greater degree of Pressure among group members reduces the number of days of later 
repayment. Cooperation among relatives and non-relatives increases the number of days of late 
repayment. Cooperation among group members seems to dilute the willingness to exercise pressure 
on delinquent members which encourages late repayment. Cooperation among non-relatives enters 
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with the same sign but significantly in the negative binomial models compare to those in probit 
models.  
Ahlin and Townsend (2005) found that cooperation among non-relatives affects repayment 
worsens. Our results show that cooperation, whether it is among relatives or non-relatives, worsens 
repayment.   
Similar to probit models, Socialties shows a negative and significant impact on delinquency 
intensity in all the negative binomial models. The effect of Relative on repayment goes in line with 
the effect of Socialties. Group members’ sensitivity to their social network lessens their moral hazard 
behavior and consequently improves their repayment performance.   
In Models 7 through 10 we add the rest of the control variables; namely, Branch, Land, 
Religion, and Groupage respectively.  
In models 7 through 10, the sign on Branch, which is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
group belongs to Al-Rusaifa’s branch, hold a negative sign. Unlike the probit models, Branch in the 
negative binomial models is statistically significant. The negative sign suggests that groups that 
belong to Al-Rusaifa’s branch have fewer days of late repayment. 
Next we include Land, the mean size of land owned by a group. The sign on Land is negative 
as expected and statistically significant in models 8 through 10. Assets ownership improves the 
capacity of the groups and reduces the number of days of late repayment.  
While the cultural factor in probit model, Religion, holds a positive sign with negligible 
predictive power, it holds a negative sign and is statistically significant in the negative binomial 
models. Religion seems to not affect the occurrence of late repayment, but once a late repayment 
occurs, more religious groups repay faster. 
In Model 10, we include the group age, Groupage. While the sign on Groupage is still positive as in 
probit model, it loses its predictive power. Other results are robust to the inclusion of Groupage.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper empirically tests the theoretical predictions about repayment performance in 
group lending programs. We use data from a survey of 160 MFW borrowing groups to test the 
significance of screening, monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on borrowing group behavior 
in terms of repayment performance. Our results are consistent with the vast majority of the 
theoretical group lending models.  
Though not overwhelmingly manifested, the results show that screening plays a role in 
reducing delinquency. Group members that have better knowledge about each other occupation 
quality tend to reduce delinquency.  
Our unmatched rich data on group pressure reveals its significance impact in reducing 
delinquency. All group pressure variables hold the expected signs and two out of three variables 
show negative impact on delinquency in all models. With the exception of Ahlin and Townsend 
(2005), this result has not been documented in the previous empirical literature.  
Next the percentage of relatives in a group showed a significant negative impact on 
delinquency. In contrast, the previous empirical literature found that relatives have a negative impact 
on repayment. Relatives may allow for better communication but may be harder to impose sanctions 
against. Our results support the hypothesis that more relatives in a group ease the process of 
monitoring and this reduces moral hazard. 
The analysis shows that groups with higher level of social ties have a lower delinquency. This 
is one of the central findings of this paper. What enhances this result is the negative effect of the 
percentage of relatives in a group on delinquency, given that such a measure can also be used as an 
indicator of social ties. Except for Zeller (1998), this result is consistent with theory but contrary to 
the previous empirical literature. 
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We also found that loan and socio-economics characteristics have to be taken into 
consideration for an effective understanding of the determinants of the groups’ repayment behavior. 
The loan size showed a non-linear effect on delinquency. While increasing loan size deepens 
delinquency, a further increase dampens it. Surprisingly, we find that education has a positive effect 
on delinquency. Another interesting finding is the fact that the access to more outside credit and 
group age increase delinquency while asset ownership seems to enhance the groups’ ability to repay 
on time. We find that religious beliefs affect the intensity of delinquency, with more religious 
borrowers repaying quicker in case of delinquency. 
 The conclusion of this chapter suggests that the performance of group lending as an 
institution is more likely to be more successful if group members screen and monitor each other, 
















   
Chapter 3 
 





The inability of the poor to meet the collateral requirements stipulated by banks and the 
inherently high cost to banks to screen and monitor the actions of the poor and to enforce loan 
contracts may all contribute to the exclusion of the poor from the credit market. One innovation for 
extending credit to the poor lies in group lending − lending to a self-selected group of borrowers. 
While a loan is given to each individual in a group, the group members are jointly liable for the 
repayment of the loan. If a group defaults, all group members will be denied future access to credit. 
Stimulated by joint liability and the threat of denial to future access to credit, group lending creates 
incentives for individual group members to screen out risky borrowers, monitor each others’ actions 
and enforce repayment. As such, group lending transfers the cost of screening, monitoring and 
contracts enforcement from lenders to borrowers. Usually, borrowers have more information about 
each other and hence can solve the asymmetric information problem that plagues lenders from 
extending credit.  
Theoretical models generally find that group lending with joint liability improves repayment 
performance through the use of a more effective mechanism of screening, monitoring, contract 
enforcement, and social ties among group members.  Many empirical studies are in support of these 
theoretical models. However, the theoretical work assumes that all group members engage in 
screening, monitoring and enforcement activities and use their social ties to ensure repayment. In 
this paper we empirically investigate whether the effectiveness of joint liability, screening and 
monitoring activities and the use of social ties effects on repayment performance differ across 
different group members. In particular, we analyze whether the provision of these activities and their 
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effect on repayment performance differ between the group leaders and the rest of the group 
members.  
The data used in the empirical analysis was obtained by the researcher himself through a 
survey of 160 groups carried out in cooperation with the Microfund for Women (MFW), a group 
lending institution in Jordan. The data drawn from the survey allows us to test whether there are any 
differences in the effects of screening and monitoring activities, the social ties and the joint liability 
payment of the group leader and the rest of the group members on the repayment performance of 
the group.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews briefly on the theoretical 
literature and lays out the motivation of this paper. Section 3.3 describes the role of the group leader 
at the MFW. Section 3.4 reviews the relevant empirical literature. Section 3.5 describes the data 
collection process and section 3.6 provides a description of the variables. In section 3.7 the empirical 
results are presented and in section 3.8 the results are summarized and discussed. Finally, section 3.9 
provides some concluding remarks. 
3.2 Theory and Motivation 
3.2.1 Theory 
 
In group lending, credit is extended to the poor through a self-selected group of borrows 
who are jointly liable for a loan. While the loan is given to individuals, the individuals as a group are 
jointly liable for the loan repayment. Borrowers can exploit the inside information that they have 
about each other to from a relatively safer borrowing group. Group lending schemes induce group 
borrowers to engage in screening out risky borrowers through their knowledge about each other’s 
capabilities, assets and character traits (Ghatak (1999), Van Tassel (1999)). Because group borrowers 
are jointly liable for the loan, the likelihood of successful projects of the group members becomes a 
common interest of the group. Group lending induces members to monitor each other actions, 
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assess whether safe production techniques are being employed and to deter any divergence of funds 
all of which improve the likelihood of successful projects (Varian (1990), Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee, 
Besely, and Guinnane (1994)). In group lending, group borrowers will be denied future access to 
credit if the group defaults. Such a threat gives group members incentives to pressure and enforce 
defaulting members to abide with the loan repayment terms (Besely and Coate (1995), Aghion 
(1999)). Floro and Yotopolous (1991) showed that group lending capitalizes on the social ties among 
borrowers to improve loan repayment. Since default has a negative impact on other group members’ 
returns and future access to loans, and if borrowers are sensitive to their existing social network, 
borrowers will reduce their moral hazard behavior.  
Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994) and Ghatak (1999) have different 
conclusions on the effect of joint liability payment on the repayment behavior of borrowing groups. 
Stiglitz (1990) accounts for the fact that the joint liability payment functions as an additional tax on 
successful borrowers who choose safer projects. Since only successful borrowers who pay the joint 
liability payment, the payoff of safe projects is hurt more than the payoff of risky projects as the 
joint liability payment increases. This in turn diminishes the attractiveness of safe projects and 
worsens the repayment performance of a borrowing group. In Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane 
(1994), an increased joint liability payment improves repayment performance. In that, an increase in 
joint liability payment raises the marginal benefit of monitoring and develops more intense group 
pressure. In Ghatak (1999), an increase in the joint liability payment worsens repayment. At a given 
interest rate, an increase in joint liability payment makes borrowers pay more on average. Higher 
joint liability payment lowers the payoff of borrowing relative to an outside option and safer 
potential borrowers are crowded out increasing the risky potential borrowers in the residual pool.   
Theoretical models generally find that group lending improves repayment performance 
through its ability to mitigate asymmetric information, to generate a new mechanism of contract 
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enforcement in the credit market and to harness social ties among group members. Many empirical 
studies are in support of these theoretical models (Ahlin and Townsend (2005), Godquine (2002), 
Sharma and Zeller (1997), Wenner (1995), Wydick (1999), Zeller (1998)). 
3.2.2 Motivation 
The previous theoretical and empirical studies investigate the effect of screening, 
monitoring, enforcement activities and social ties on the repayment performance at the group level. 
In this, it is assumed that all group members engage in screening, monitoring and enforcement 
activities and the repayment performance of the group is a reflection of an equally collective effort 
of all members. In this paper we empirically investigate whether the effectiveness of the activities of 
screening and monitoring and the social ties effects on repayment performance differ across 
different group members. In this, we analyze whether the provision of these activities and their 
effect on repayment performance differ between the group leaders and the rest of the group 
members. The motivation of this paper arises from the nature of the role played by the group 
leaders in group lending schemes. A description of the role of the group leaders at the MFW and the 
motivation of this paper are discussed next.  
3.3 The MFW and the Role of the Group Leader 
The Group Guaranteed Lending Product (GGL) offered by MFW utilizes the group lending 
methodology, where individual borrowers themselves form a group that jointly guarantees the loan 
to the group. The group members must know each other and respect the loan size caps by cycle. 
There are also restrictions on who can form groups with whom. Within groups, members may not 
be business partners or from the same family. The required group size is between 4-6 members, and 
the group loans on average, range between JD200 and JD500 per borrower. The initial loan size for 
all new members is on average JD200. The groups have the choice to make their repayments either 
in bi-weekly or monthly installments. The MFW holds two basic meetings with the borrowing 
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groups, one to fill initial forms and discuss policies and the second to define group members’ roles 
(leader and treasurer) and to review the loan contract orally. In the disbursement meeting at the 
MFW branch, clients are reminded of the contract policies. 
The group leader is selected by the group members and functions as an intermediary 
between the group members and the loan officers. Being a group leader or treasurer is a voluntary 
activity and does not generate any financial privileges. The group leader supervises the group 
members and updates the loan officer with any developments related to group members such as 
change of projects, projects termination, change of address of residence or business, and any case of 
illness that may hinder a group member to abide with repayment. Along with the treasurer, the 
group leader collects the monthly payment installments from group members. If a group member 
refuses or fails to repay her monthly installment, the group leader can call the group members for a 
meeting to discuss and update the group members with the incident. In this meeting, the group 
leader arranges to collect the remaining balance of the defaulting member. The group leader has to 
report such an incident to the loan officer.      
On the disbursement day, the loan officer gives the group leader and the treasurer one 
cheque equal to the total group loan. Then the group, as a whole, goes to a designated bank to 
covert it into cash. Only the leader and the treasurer can touch cheque and money, while others 
supervise. The leader and the treasurer, under the banker’s eyes, do the loan sharing among group 
members. Installment repayment works in similar way: the group leader and the treasurer raise 
installments from each member, deposit the total amount in the MFW designated bank account and 
deliver the payment invoice to the MFW on the same day. The repayment installment process also 
occurs under other group member supervision.  
In many group lending schemes including the MFW, groups are formed endogenously. After 
a group is formed, group members elect a group leader. Groups may then go through many loan 
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cycles. Any group member may exit at the end of each loan cycle and new members may join. A 
group leader functions as an intermediary between the group members and the lending program by 
supervising the group members and updating the loan officer with any repayment difficulties and 
any developments related to group members. The group leader’s responsibility in supervising the 
rest of the group members and keeping the loan officer updated give them an advantage in obtaining 
information regarding the reputation, indebtedness and the wealth of the rest of the group members 
and their efforts employed in projects. The group leader’s relative advantage in obtaining 
information about the rest of the group members places her in a relatively better position to screen 
borrowers and monitor their actions.  The role of the group leader as a representative of the group 
to the lending program and her role in updating the loan officer of any repayment difficulties may 
intensify her incentives to enforce repayment, and to use her social ties with the rest of the group to 
improve repayment. It is this relative informational advantage of the group leaders that drives the 
suggestion that the activities of the group leaders may have different impacts on the repayment 
performance of the group compared to the impacts of the activities of the rest of the group 
members. Data from a survey of 160 borrowing groups from the MFW in Jordan allows us to shed 
light on the impact of the group leader on the group repayment performance relative to the impact 
of the rest of the group members. 
3.4 Literature Review 
 
To our best knowledge, Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab (2005) were the first and the sole 
authors to address the question of this paper. The authors used data from a questionnaire held in 
Eritrea among 102 borrowing groups to distinguish between the effects of monitoring and social ties 
of the group leader versus the other group members on the repayment performance of the group.  
The data the authors had did not allow them to analyze the differences in the impact of screening 
and enforcement behavior of the group leader versus the other group members on repayment. The 
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borrowing groups surveyed were from two group lending programs; the Saving and Micro Credit 
program (SMCP) and the Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme (SZSCS). Both programs 
function similarly. Groups in SMCP consist of 3-7 members and may not have family ties. 
Individuals in SMCP are allowed to borrow after accumulating a mandatory savings equal to 10 per 
cent of the loan size. Loan size ranges between USD70-USD710. Groups in SZSCS also consist of 
3-7 members and individuals are allowed to borrow only after they accumulate a mandatory savings 
equal to 5 per cent of the loan size on new loans and up to 15 per cent on repeated loans. The loan 
size in SZSCS ranges between USD70-USD570.  
Both programs operate in rural and urban areas. The groups in these programs are formed 
through self selections. After the group is selected, the group has to select a group leader and 
(sometimes) a group secretary. The group leader functions as an intermediary between the group 
members and the program staff. Leading a group is a voluntary activity that does not generate any 
financial privileges to the leader. The group leader has to keep the programs’ staff updated with the 
performance and sustainability of the group. Moreover, the group leader has to chair group 
meetings, collect the payment installments from the group members and transfer them to the loan 
officer, visit group members, discuss business and group related problems, and call for extra 
meetings if repayment problems occur.   
Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab build their hypothesis based on the description of tasks of 
the group leaders. That is, monitoring and enforcement activities within a group may differ between 
the group leader and other group members. The decision for the group leader to call for an extra 
group meeting is taken by the authors as an indication of extra monitoring and enforcement efforts 
by the group leader that may further enhance repayment. Also, the role of the group leader in 
collecting payment installments from group members and visiting and discussing business related 
problems with group members all add additional information to the group leader that facilitates his 
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mission in monitoring other group members. These additional channels of monitoring and 
enforcement are less explicitly available to other group members. 
The sample used by Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab came from a survey of 102 groups, of 
which 56 were from SMPC and 46 from SZSCS. In the survey, the authors asked questions about 
the socio-economic characteristics of the group members and the saving and repayment 
performance of individual group members. The survey also includes questions about the group 
formation process, the existence of social ties, the process of screening, monitoring and 
enforcement within groups. From each group, the group leader and one or more group members 
were selected to answer the survey questions. One part of the questions was asked to both the group 
leader and other member(s) of each group; and the other part was asked to the group leader. The 
authors obtained information from 351 group members, of which 102 were group leaders. Out of 
351 group members surveyed, 167 were from the SZSCS and 184 from SMCP.  
The set up of the survey allows the authors to split the information for the independent 
variables into two separate variables, one related to the group leader and one related to the rest of 
the group members. Due to data problems, screening and enforcement measures were deleted from 
the regression analysis. The paper focuses only on the differences in monitoring and social ties 
activities of the group leader and the rest of the group and their impact on repayment. In each 
regression analysis, eight group leader specific variables, eight group members - excluding group 
leaders - specific variables presented in averages, and two group level variables are used as 
independent variables. The group leader specific variables include two measures of monitoring 
variables, two measures of social ties variables, and four control variables. The two measures of 
monitoring are the average distance in meters of homestead or business location of the group leader 
from the other members of the group and a dummy variable equal to one if the group leader 
regularly visits the other members of his group. The social ties measures include a dummy variable 
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equal to one if the group leader knew the other group members before the formation of the group 
and the length of time the group leader has lived in the interview area. The control variables are the 
age of the group leader, the monthly installment of the group leader as a percentage of his monthly 
income, the value the group leader attaches to having access to loans from the lending program in 
the future, and the educational background of the group leader. The same measures used for the 
group leader are used for the rest of the group members and are presented in averages. The group 
level variables include a dummy equal to one if the group has rules and regulations on how to run 
the group and the number of members in the group.  
Three different dependent variables were used all of which are dummies. The first 
dependent variable takes a value of one if at least one member of a group indicated that he has had 
repayment problems in the current loan cycle (ARREAR1). The second dependent variable takes a 
value of one if at least one member of a group other than the group leader indicated that he has had 
repayment problems in the current loan cycle (ARREARS2). And the last dependent variable takes a 
value of one if the group leader indicated that he has had repayment problems in the current loan 
cycle (ARREARS3).    
Using logit estimation, the empirical results show that both ARREARS1 and ARREARS2 
are reduced if the group leader knew the group members before forming the group, a measure of 
social ties, and if the group leader assigns more value to future access to loans from the programs. 
From all the variables related to group members other than the group leader, the installment 
payment of group members as a percentage of income is the only significant factor that increases 
both ARREARS1 and ARREARS2.18 When using the third repayment measure ARREARS3 
                                                 
18 In the first regression of ARREARS2 (repayment problems of group members other than group leader), the length of 
time the group leader has lived in the interview area, an indication of social ties, significantly increases ARREARS2. The 
authors conclude that this social ties measure holds the wrong sign and therefore was dropped in the subsequent 
regression analysis. This wrong sign, however, can be an indication that group members with good social ties may face 
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(repayment problems of group leader), the social ties and monitoring variables related group leader 
and those related to the rest of the group members become insignificant factors in determining the 
repayment performance of the group leader. The results show that the age of the group leader and 
his monthly installment as a percentage of his income increases his repayment problems. The results 
also show that the higher the value a group leader assigns to future access to loans from the lending 
program the lower his repayment problems.  
Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab concluded that the social ties of the group leader with the 
rest of the group improve the repayment performance of the group, whereas the social ties among 
the rest of the group members has no impact on the repayment performance of the group. They 
find all monitoring measures, either of the group leader or the other group members, are 
insignificant determinants of repayment performance.   
3.5 The Data 
 
During the months of February through May of 2005 I carried out a survey of 160 randomly 
selected borrowing groups of the MFW in Jordan. Two of the MFIs in Jordan provide group loans, 
the MFW and the Jordanian Micro Credit Company (JMCC). The MFW started its group lending 
program in 1996 while the JMCC started in 2004. The sample focuses only on the MFW group 
borrowers because the JMCC group lending program was newly introduced with the vast majority of 
the group borrowers having short history of repayment. The survey covered two provinces, Irbid 
(north) and Al-Rusaifa (mid-north). The reasons for choosing these two provinces are due to their 
geographical proximity to my place of residence and to the fixed budget and time I had. In Irbid, 84 
groups were surveyed while in Al-Rusaifa the survey covered 76 groups. The survey took place at 
the MFW branch offices of Irbid and Al-Rusaifa. The MFW appoints a leader for each group who 
                                                                                                                                                             
difficulties in pressurizing a member with repayment problems, which dilutes the enforcement process. See Wenner 




   
functions as an intermediary between the group members and the MFW loan officers. The official 
leaders of the groups were interviewed as they walked into these branches for loan transactions 
related matters. Sitting at the MFW branch office and waiting for any group leader to show up 
guarantees that each possible group leader has the same probability of being selected in the sample. 
Three group leaders out of 163 refused to provide answers to the questionnaire.  
Data on the loan size, the interest rate, the group size, and the number of continuing, old, 
and new members of each group, and the loan application dates were obtained from the MFW’s 
data base. Also obtained from the MFW’s data base are the number of installments, the amount of 
installments due, the due dates of repayment, the actual repayment amounts, and the repayment 
dates for each group.  
In the survey, we asked questions about the socio-economic characteristics of the group 
leader as well as other group members. We also included questions on the process of screening, 
monitoring, enforcement and the existence of social ties within groups. In addition to the socio-
economic characteristics, questions in the survey distinguish between the screening and monitoring 
activities of the group leader versus the screening and monitoring activities of the rest of the group 
members. Also, the survey included questions on the existence of social ties of the group leader with 
the rest of the group and the existence of social ties among the rest of the group members.  
The data drawn from the survey allow us to test whether group leaders have any role to play 
in the repayment performance of their groups. Specifically, we investigate whether the group leader’s 
activities of screening and monitoring and her social ties with the rest of the group members have 
any consequences on the repayment behavior of the group. We also investigate whether the joint 
liability payment of the group leader has any consequences for the repayment performance of the 
group. In doing so, we compare the role of the group leader with the role of other group members 
in mitigating adverse selection and alleviating moral hazard behavior. That is, we compare the effects 
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of screening and monitoring activities, social ties and the joint liability payment of the group leader 
to those of the rest of the group members on repayment.  
While the effect of group pressure and enforcement can be an important factor in affecting 
the group repayment behavior (Besely and Coate (1995), Aghion (1999)), the data obtained does not 
allow us to separate the effects of pressure and enforcement exercised by the group leader versus the 
effects of pressure and enforcement exercised by the rest of the group members. This is why this 
paper focuses only on the differences of the effects of screening and monitoring activities, the social 
ties and the joint liability payment of the group leader and the rest of the group members on the 
repayment performance.   
3.6 Variables Description 
 
3.6.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable uses repayment data obtained from the MFW data base. This data 
includes the number of installments, the amount of installments due, the due dates of repayment, 
the actual repayment amounts, and the actual repayment dates for each group. Our measure of 
repayment is the sum of late days of repayment for each group up until the survey took place. We 
call this measure Delinquency Intensity. On average, groups have 3 days of late repayment with a 
minimum of zero days and a maximum of 41 days.  
3.6.2 Independent Variables 
The independent and the dependent variables used are summarized in Tables 3.1. Delinquency 
Intensity is the repayment measure discussed above. In Table 3.1 and thereafter, variables related to 
group leaders are preceded by the letter L while variables related to the rest of the group members 





   
Table 3.1: Variables Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev 
Dependent Variable 
Delinquency Intensity Number of days of late repayment 3.1062 6.345 
Control Variables 
Rephist Repayment history during the current loan cycle 5.9625 2.479 
Branch A dummy equal to one if the group belong to Al-Rusaifa branch 0.475 0.500 
Personal Characteristics 
Age of the group leader 35.525 7.897 
Average age of the rest of the group members 35.413 5.663 
A dummy variable if the group leader is married 0.9125 0.283 
The percentage of the rest of the group members that are married 0.9223 0.146 
Number of children of the group leader  4.225 2.670 
Average number of children of the rest of the group members 4.0668 1.691 
A dummy variable if the group leader has a high school education or higher 0.525 0.500 
A dummy variable if the rest of the group members have an average of high school 
education or higher 
0.1562 0.364 
A dummy variable of the group leader observes the five daily prayers 0.9625 0.190 
The percentage of the rest of the group members that observe the five daily prayers 0.8428 0.261 
Joint Liability Variables 
LJointLiab Group leader joint liability  0.7489 0.050 
GJlintLiab Rest of group joint liability 0.7656 0.033 
Screening Variables 
LScreen1 A dummy variable equal to one if the group leader knows the 
quality of other group members’ occupations 
0.9437 0.231 
GScreen1 A dummy variable equal to one if the rest of the group members 
know the quality of each other’s occupations 
.9500 0.218 
LScreen2 An index of screening that ranges between 1 and 3 2.075 1.037 
GScreen2 An index of screening that ranges between 1 and 3 2.1625 1.092 
Monitoring Variables 
Lphone A dummy variable equal to one if the group leader has a cell 
phone or land phone 
0.825 0.381 
Gphone A dummy variable equal to one if at least two group members 
other than the leader have phone connection, either cell or land 
phone 
0.606 0.490 
LSamebus Percentage of other group members for which the leader shares 
the same type of occupation 
0.1536 0.224 
GSamebus Percentage of the rest of the group that has the same occupation 0.2841 0.335 
 
Social Ties Variables 
Lsocialties An index of the leader’s social ties with relatives  0.4837 0.893 
Gsocialties An index of social ties among the rest of the group members who 
are relatives 
0.7976 1.590 
LInception A dummy variable equal to one if the group leader was in the 
group since its inception 
0.9437 0.231 
GInception A dummy variable equal to one if at least two members of the rest 






   
Control Variables 
        Rephist is the number of installments made or supposed to be made since the loan was 
issued. It reflects the repayment history for each group in the current loan cycle. If repayment occurs 
with some probability p each month, then groups with a longer history are more likely to have late 
repayment. Toward the end of the cycle, however, groups are expected to improve their repayment 
performance to be eligible for another loan cycle. Therefore, the effect of repayment history is non-
linear. The log of repayment history (lnRephist) will be considered in the empirical analysis. 
The second control variable we use is a dummy variable equal one if a group belongs to the 
Al-Rusaifa branch and zero if a group belongs to the Irbid branch. We call this variable Branch and it 
captures any difference in repayment performance of groups that belong to the Al-Rusaifa’s branch 
versus the repayment performance of groups that belong to the Irbid’s branch. Both Rephist and 
Branch refer to the group as a whole. 
Many personal characteristic variables have been used but not shown in the analysis. These 
include the age of the group leader versus the average age of the rest of the group members, the 
marital status of the group leader versus the marital status of the rest of the group members, the 
number of children of the group leader versus the average number of children of the rest of the 
group members, the education level of the group leader versus the education level of the rest of the 
group members, and the religion intensity of the group leader versus the religion intensity of the rest 
of the group members. The description and the summary statistics of these variables are shown in 
Table 3.1. On average, the group leader is 35.52 years old and the average age of the rest of the 
group members is 35.41. The marital status and the number of children of the group leaders are 
similar to those of the rest of the group members. The percentage of group leaders who are married 
is 91 and it is 92 for the rest of the group members. The group leader has on average 4.22 children 
and the average number of children of the rest of the group members is 4.06. The summary statistics 
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shows that the group leader is more educated and observes the five daily prayers more than the rest 
of the group members. Approximately 53 percent of the group leaders have high school education 
or higher while only 16 percent of the groups other than the group leaders have a high school 
education or higher. Group leaders on average have 10 years of education while the rest of the 
group members have 8 years. The percentage of the group leaders who pray five times a day is 95 
while it is 84 for the rest of the group members.  
We omit these personal characteristic variables because of the high correlation among some 
of them and because of the insignificant impact they have on the dependent variable. The results 
reported below are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of these control variables.   
Joint Liability Variables 
Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994) and Ghatak (1999) have different 
conclusions on the effect of joint liability payment on the repayment behavior of borrowing groups. 
While Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak (1999) predict that the joint liability payment worsens repayment, 
Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994) predict that an increased joint liability payment improves 
repayment.  
In Stiglitz (1990), the joint liability payment affects the choice of safe versus risky projects. 
Since only successful borrowers pay the joint liability payment, an increase in the joint liability 
payment hurts the payoff of safe projects more than the payoff of risky projects. The attractiveness 
of safe projects therefore diminishes and the repayment performance of a borrowing group worsens. 
In Ghatak (1999), at a given interest rate, higher joint liability payment makes safe borrowers pay 
more on average which crowds out safer potential borrowers and increases risky potential borrowers 
in the residual pool. According to Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994), an increased joint liability 
payment raises the marginal of monitoring and develops more intense group pressure.  
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Data on the group loan sizes are obtained from the MFW data base. Our strategy to measure 
the degree of joint liability exploits the information on group loan sizes and the share of the group 
leaders from these loans.19 Our measure for the group leader joint liability payment, LJLiab is the 
percentage of the total group loan that the group leader has to pay to the MFW if the rest of the 
group members default.20 The measure for the rest of the group joint liability payment is the 
percentage of the total group loan that a member of the rest of the group, on average, has to pay if 
the rest of the group , including the group leader, default.21 We call this variable GJLiab. We believe 
that LJointLiab and GJointLiab are more direct and accurate proxies for the joint liability payment 
than proxies used in the literature.  
Screening Variables 
 
Ghatak (1999), Van Tassel (1999) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) presented models where 
group lending, via screening, can mitigate problems created by adverse selection. The key is that 
group formation displays positive assortative matching under group lending schemes. A successful 
safe borrower is more likely to pay the joint liability payment if he teams with a risky borrower but 
less likely to pay the joint liability payment if he teams with a safe borrower. Therefore, any safe 
borrower prefers to team with another safe borrower to form a group. In these models, and as a 
necessary prerequisite for screening to function, borrowers are assumed to be equipped with 
knowledge about each other’s type of risk, capabilities and assets. 
We use two measures for screening. The first is a dummy variable, LScreen1, equal to 1 if the 
group leader knows the quality and sales of other group members’ occupations and GScreen1 is a 
                                                 
19 The information on the group loan sizes were obtained from the MFW data base while the information on the group 
leader loan sizes were obtained from the survey. 
 
20 The group leader joint liability payment is measured as (1 - (group leader loan size/total group loan size)). 
 
21 The rest of the group joint liability payment is measured as (1-(average loan size of a member of the rest of the 
group/total group loan size)) 
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dummy variable equal 1 if the rest of the group members know the quality and sales of each others’ 
occupations.     
The second proxy for screening attempts to measure the knowledge of group members 
about each other’s assets and debts. LScreen2 utilizes 4 yes/no questions asked to the group leader: 
whether the group leader is aware of the debt other group members have with the MFW, the debt 
and savings other group members have with banks other than the MFW, debt that other members 
have with individuals outside the group, and assets that members have. LScreen2 is an index equal to 
the number of yes responses to these questions. The same set of questions was asked to the group 
leader about other members. That is, whether the rest of the group members are aware of each 
others’ debt with the MFW, each others’ debt and savings with banks other than the MFW, each 
others’ debt with individuals outside the group, and each others’ assets. The yes responses to these 
questions compose GScreen2. 
Monitoring Variables 
 
Armendariz and Beatriz (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Banerjee, Besley, and 
Guinnane (1994) presented models in which peer monitoring mitigates moral hazard behavior of 
individual group members. Stiglitz (1990), another peer monitoring model, deduces that the 
repayment performance in group lending programs is positively related to the members’ 
homogeneity with respect to their projects’ riskiness. Cost of monitoring is measured using different 
proxies.  
LSamebus is a proxy for occupational homogeneity. It is the percentage of the rest of the 
group members for which the leader shares the same type of occupation. GSamebus is the percentage 
of the rest of the group members that have the same occupation. The more homogeneous the group 
is in term of occupation, the easier to monitor. 
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We attempt to measure the cost of monitoring by looking at the access of group members to 
phone services. The hypothesis is that the higher the access to phone services of group members, 
the easier to monitor. The survey data contains information on the access of group members to 
both land and cell phone services. Lphone is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the group leader has a 
land or cell phone and Gphone is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least two of the rest of the group 
members have land or cell phone.  
The monitoring variables reflect the extent to which group members can acquire 
information about each other putting them in a better monitoring position. We expect a negative 
sign on the coefficients of LSamebus, GSamebus, Lphone, and Gphone: if group members have the same 
occupation and have phone communication then the flow of information would be easier and they 
will be better equipped to monitor each other actions.  
Social Ties Variables 
 
Floro and Yotopolous (1991) showed that the success of group lending depends on its 
ability to harness social ties among borrows to improve loan repayment. The importance of social 
ties is explained in terms of the consequences of a group member default. Since default has a 
negative impact on other group members’ returns and future access to loans, and since borrowers 
are sensitive to their existing social network, borrowers will lessen their moral hazard behavior. 
Consequently, social ties between group members improve group repayment performance. 
The first proxy of social ties considers the social ties of the group leader with his relatives in 
a group. In this, we consider the percentage of the rest of the group members that are related to the 
group leader and then consider the degree of social ties between the group leader and his relatives. 
The degree of social ties utilizes 6 yes/no questions asked to group leaders; whether group members 
can get any type of help from other group members if needed, whether group members can count 
on each other to take care of a child if one needs to go away for a while, whether any group member 
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has visited other group members in the past week, whether any group member has had phone 
conversations with other group members in the past week, whether any group member seeks help 
from other group members to make a decision, whether any group member seeks mediation from 
others to solve a dispute with other group members. The number of yes responses to these 
questions comprises an index of social ties within the group as a whole. LSocialties is therefore the 
social ties of the group leader with his relatives in a group.22 A similar measure, GSocialties considers 
the social ties among relatives in the rest of the group members.  
The second proxy of social ties considers whether group members were in the same group 
since its inception. Linception is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the group leader was in the group 
since inception and Ginception is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least two members of the rest of 
the group were in the group since inception. 
3.7 Empirical Results 
The following empirical analysis uses negative binomial models to estimate the effects of a 
number of independent variables on group repayment behavior, Delinquency Intensity. We test the 
effect of joint liability, screening and monitoring activities, and the social ties of the group leader on 
the repayment behavior of the group.  We also test the effect of joint liability, the screening and 
monitoring activities, and the social ties of the rest of the group members on the repayment 
behavior of the group. This allows us to compare the role of the group leader with the role of the 
rest of the group members in affecting the repayment behavior of the borrowing group.  
The negative binomial model derives from a Poisson distribution. In the Poisson model iy  
has mean ( 'expi )ixμ β= and variance iμ , signifying equaldispersion. However, the conditional 
variance in most applications is greater than the conditional mean. While such overdispersion does 
                                                 
22 For example, if 50 percent of the rest of the group members are relative to the group leader and the social ties index is 
6, then social ties of the group leader with his relatives, LSocialties,  is 3, (50%*6). 
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not affect the poisson regression model estimates being consistent, such estimates are inefficient. 
The standard errors of the Poisson regression model will be biased downward which will over 
estimate the significance of the explanatory variables (Long 1997). 
Overdispersion seems likely in our study because there are important explanatory variables 
that are difficult to capture (e.g., group members’ income, group members’ occupation risk level), 
and because error may exist in the estimates of some variables (pure randomness). Delinquency 
Intensity ranges in value from zero and 41. Approximately 85% of the sample takes values of 0, 1, 2, 
3, or 4. The mean of the number of days of late repayment is 3.1 days with a variance of 40.26. The 
raw data are therefore overdispersed and the inclusion of the regressors does not eliminate this 
overdispersion in Poisson regression model indicating its inadequacy of fit. If overdispersion exists, 
a Poisson model is not appropriate and a negative binomial model can be used instead.  
A negative binomial regression model includes a random error term iε  representing the 
effect of omitted explanatory variables or pure randomness. In this model 
( ) ( )'exp x expi i i i iμ β ε μ ε= + =%  where ( )exp iε is a gamma distributed random variable with mean 
one and varianceα . If 0α = , the negative binomial reduces to the Poisson distribution. The 
appropriateness of applying the Poisson model versus the negative binomial model can be assessed 
based on the statistical significance of estimate value ofα . 
Using the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, the negative binomial results are shown 
in Table 3.2. In this table, variables preceded by the letter L are the explanatory variables related to 
the group leader while variables preceded by the letter G are related to the rest of the group. Table 
3.2 shows that there is a strong evidence of overdispersion. The dispersion parameter, α , is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Alternatively, the computed likelihood ratio tests of overdispersion 
are even more highly significant.  
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Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Results 
 
Variables Coefficient t-value 
Constant 5.9355 (1.72)* 
Control Variables 
Rephist 5.5541 (5.92)*** 
Branch -0.8009 (-3.11)*** 
Joint Liability Variables 
LJointLiab -6.2155 (-2.95)*** 
GJjointLiab -1.9482 (-0.65) 
Screening Variables 
Lscreen1 -0.6007 (-1.58) 
Gsreen1 0.3154 (0.47) 
Lscreen2 -0.4310 (-2.10)** 
Gscreen2 0.0475 (0.22) 
Monitoring Variables 
Lsamebus 0.2797 (0.56) 
Gsamebus -0.2986 (-0.74) 
Lphone -0.2250 (-0.76) 
Gphone -0.0191 (-0.07) 
Social Ties Variables 
Lsoicalties -0.2768 (-2.15)** 
Gsocialties -0.1326 (-1.73)* 
Linception -2.3146 (-3.52)*** 
Ginception 0.7333 (2.15)** 
 
Log Likelihood  -287.3405 
α 1.522 (5.41)*** 
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0 
chibar2(1)  346.26 
p-value 0.000 
 
Notes: Delinquency Intensity: The number of late days of repayment. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 
1% are denoted by *, **, *** respectively. 
 
Since the dependent variable involves late repayment at any time during the current loan 
cycle up until the interview took place, groups with longer history are more likely to run into 
repayment difficulties. The coefficient on lnrephist, the natural log of repayment history, is positive as 
expected and statistically significant. Groups with a longer history of repayment have a higher 
probability of late repayment. This probability increases at a decreasing rate as shown by the positive 
sign on the coefficient of lnrephist. 
The variable Branch captures any difference in repayment behavior of group borrowers 
across the two branches surveyed. The coefficient on Branch, which is a dummy variable equal to one 
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if a group belongs to Al-Rusaifa’s branch, is negative and statistically significant. The negative sign 
suggests that groups in Al-Rusaifa’s branch have better repayment performance than those groups in 
Irbid’s branch.  
The signs on the joint liability variables of the group leader and the rest of the group 
members are negative. The negative signs on LJointliab and GJointliab strongly support the theories of 
Banerjee, Baseley and Guinnane (1994) over Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak (1999) and the empirical 
work of Ahlin and Townsend (2005). The coefficient on the variable related to the group leader, 
LJointliab, is statistically significant while the coefficient on the variable related to the rest of the 
group members, GJointliab, is not. This indicates that the higher the joint liability of the group leader, 
the better the repayment performance of the group.  
 
According to Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994), an increase in joint liability payment 
raises the marginal benefit of monitoring and develops more intense group pressure that reduces the 
number of days of late repayment. The empirical analysis provides statistical evidence that joint 
liability payment of the group leader is more strongly related to repayment performance than joint 
liability payment of the rest of the group members. That is, the higher the joint liability payment of 
the group leader the lower the days of late repayment. While the coefficient on the joint liability 
payment of the rest of the group members is negative, it is statistically insignificant. To our best 
knowledge, we are the first to use to this direct and accurate proxy for the joint liability payment and 
the first to record the positive impact of joint liability payment of the group leader on good 
repayment performance. 23  
                                                 
23 In Ahlin and Townsend (2005), the joint liability payment is measured for the group as a whole. The authors used the 
percentage of group members who don’t own land as a measure for joint liability payment. The joint liability variable in 
Ahlin and Townsend was found to worsen repayment. The authors justify the use of this variable as a proxy for the joint 
liability payment by the following quote “One option the MFI has toward the end of the process of reclaiming 
delinquent loans is to seize assets of the borrower or guarantors, most often land. This fact leads to some variation in the 
actual degree of liability. If all group members own land, then there is less of a chance that a guarantor will in the end 
have to pay rather than the borrower himself, since the MFI can take his land. If on the other hand some members of 
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Through the group members’ knowledge about each others’ capabilities, assets and character 
traits, the practice of screening is expected to crowd in safer type of borrowers which improves the 
repayment performance of the group. In the MFW, groups form endogenously. After a group is 
formed, group members elect a group leader. Groups may then go through many loan cycles. Any 
group member may exit at the end of each loan cycle and new members may join. Screening 
therefore can take place when the group is first being formed and at the beginning of each loan cycle 
if a new member joins the group. The coefficient on the first screening variable of the group leader, 
LScreen1, is negative as expected but only marginally significant. The coefficient on the first 
screening variable of the rest of the group members, GScreen1, is positive but statistically 
insignificant. These empirical results suggest that it is the group leader’s knowledge about the quality 
and sales of other group members’ occupations that improves the group’s repayment performance. 
The knowledge of the rest of the group members about the quality and sales of each others’ 
occupations seems to have no impact on the group repayment performance.  
The second measure of screening behaves similarly. The coefficient of the second screening 
measure of the group leader, LScreen2, is negative as expected and has strong predictive power on 
the days of late repayment. On the other hand, the coefficient of the second screening measure of 
the rest of the group members, GScreen2, is positive but has no predictive power on repayment. This 
suggests that the knowledge of the group leader about the rest of group members’ assets and debts 
reduces the days of late repayment while the knowledge of the rest of the group members about 
each others’ assets and debts has no significant impact on the days of late repayment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the group are landless, then the effective degree of joint liability can be thought of as higher, since it is more likely a 
guarantor will have to repay if a landless borrower defaults.”  However, one may argue that the higher the percentage of 
landless members in a group, the lower the capacity of this group to repay.  
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The empirical analysis provides statistical evidence that screening activities of the group 
leaders are more effective in reducing the number of days of late repayment than the screening 
activities of the rest of the group members.   
While the majority of the coefficients on the monitoring variables hold the expected sign, 
none of these variables are statistically significant. The fact that the group leader shares the same 
type of occupation and has more phone communications with the rest of the group members seems 
to have no impact on group repayment performance. Also, the fact that the rest of the group 
members share the same occupation and have more phone communications with each other does 
not have any predictive power on the group repayment performance. 
The last set of variables discussed is the social ties variables. The coefficients on the first 
measure of social ties, LSocialties and GSocialties, are negative as expected and statistically significant.  
The better the degree of social ties of the group leader with his relatives in a group and the better the 
degree of social ties of relatives among the rest of the group members, the lower the number of days 
of late repayment. Since default has a negative impact on the returns and future access to loans of 
other group members, and if members are sensitive to their existing social network, then borrowers 
(the group leader and the rest of the group members) will lessen their moral hazard behavior.  
The coefficient on the second proxy of social ties for the group leader, Linception, is negative 
as expected and statistically significant. The fact that the group leader has been in the group since 
inception, an indication of good social ties with the rest of the group members, reduces the days of 
late repayment of the group relative to groups where the group leader is a new member in the group. 
The second measure of social ties among the rest of the group members, Ginception, has an 
unexpected positive sign and statistically significant. Groups that have at least two members since 
inception, other than the group leader, have more days of late repayment than groups with fewer 
members since inception.  
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Since Gsocialties and Ginception are both measures of social ties among the rest of the group 
members, the fact that Gsocialties improves the group repayment performance while Ginception 
worsens it seems to be contradictory. This contradictory result may stem from the fact that some 
regressors are highly correlated. To detect multicollinearity, and since there is no unique method of 
detecting multicollinearity, we use a few rules of thumbs. These rules of thumbs include checking 
the pair-wise correlations among regressors and using auxiliary regressions methods. Among other 
correlated regressors, the coefficient of correlation between Lscreen2 and Gscreen2 is 0.75 and it is 
0.32 between Linception and Ginception with a significance level of 1% for both. In the auxiliary 
regression method, we adopt Klien’s rule of thumb, which suggests that multicollinearity can be a 
problem if the 2R obtained from the regression of Y on all other regressors is lower than the 
2R obtained from an auxiliary regression, that is, from the regression of on the remaining 
regressors. The overall 
jX
2R for the negative binomial model is 0.1211 while the 2R of the negative 
binomial auxiliary regression of Gscreen2 on the remaining regressors is 0.1379. The regression 
coefficients in Table 3.2 are altered when one of Lscreen2, Gscreen2, Linception, or Ginception is added 
or dropped, which is another possible evidence of multiconllinearity. Coefficients may have the 
wrong signs in the presence of multicollinearity.  
No single solution is suggested to eliminate multicollinearity. However, as noted by Greene, 
“The obvious practical remedy (and surely the most frequently used) is to drop variables suspected 
of causing the problem from the regression, that is, to impose on the regression an assumption, 
possibly erroneous, that the “problem” variable does not appear in the model.”24 In Table 3.3, we 
deviate from the basic regression shown in Table 3.2 by; first, dropping the rest of the group related 
variables to estimate the group leader regression and second; dropping the group leader related 
variables to estimate the rest of the group members’ regression.  
                                                 
24 William Greene (2000, p. 258) 
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Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Results of the Group Leader and the Rest of the Group 
Members 
 
 Group Leader Other Group Members 
Variables Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 3.8192 (2.05)** -4.7746 (-1.64)* 
Control Variables 
Rephist 5.5745 (5.67)*** 5.9667 (6.19)*** 
Branch -0.6547 (-2.47)** -0.5935 (-1.95)** 
Joint Liability Variables 
LJointLiab -5.0468 (-2.52)***   
GJjointLiab   2.6962 (0.89) 
Screening Variables 
Lscreen1 -0.6255 (-1.65)*   
Gsreen1   -0.1280 (-0.16) 
Lscreen2 -0.3878 (-2.83)***   
Gscreen2   -0.1812 (-1.26) 
Monitoring Variables 
Lsamebus 0.2859 (0.57)   
Gsamebus   -0.2996 (-0.74) 
Lphone -0.2620 (-0.83)   
Gphone   -0.1129 (-0.40) 
Social Ties Variables 
Lsoicalties -0.2494 (-1.73)*   
Gsocialties   -0.1674 (-2.14)** 
Linception -1.8172 (-3.37)***   
Ginception   -0.0418 (-0.09) 
 
Log Likelihood -290.40384 -299.05715 
α 1.620 (5.89)*** 2.011 (6.03)*** 
Likelihood-ratio test of α = 0 
Chibar2(1)  414.41 526.99 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Delinquency Intensity: The number of late days of repayment. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% 
are denoted by *, **, *** respectively. 
Using the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, the negative binomial results of the 
group leader and the rest of the group members separate regressions are shown in Table 3.3. Except 
for Ginception and the rest of the group measures of screening Gscreen1 and Gscreen2, in terms of signs 
and significance levels the results of the separate regressions are comparable to the full model in 
Table 3.2. The reduction in collinearity in the separate regressions is clear. The screening measures 
of the rest of the group Gscreen1 and Gscreen2 enter with the expected negative sign but remain 
statistically insignificant. Ginception also becomes insignificant. All other results remain the same. 
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3.8 Summary of Results and Discussion 
 
The empirical analysis provides evidence of the important and strong role of the group 
leaders in improving the repayment performance of the group as a whole. Most important, the 
empirical analysis provides evidence that the joint liability of the group leader is more strongly 
related to the repayment performance than the joint liability of the rest of the group members. The 
higher the joint liability of the group leaders is, the stronger are incentives for monitoring and 
pressure activities by the group leader, which leads to better repayment performance. We found no 
evidence that the joint liability of the rest of the group members has an impact in reducing the 
number of days of late repayment. This result has not been recorded before. 
The role of the group leaders in screening is clear. The results show that it is the group 
leaders’ knowledge of occupation quality, assets and debts of other group members that improves 
the repayment performance. We found no evidence that screening by the rest of the group members 
has a similar impact.   
None of the monitoring variables of the group leader and the rest of the group members is 
significantly related to repayment performance. This is true for the full model, the group leader 
model, and the rest of the group members’ model. The insignificant role of monitoring has also 
been found by Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab (2005). 
The empirical results show that the social ties of the group leader with the rest of the group 
members as well as the social ties of the rest of the group members among each others improve 
repayment performance. While both measures of the social ties of the group leader reduce the 
number of days of late repayment, only one measure of social ties of the rest of the group members 
shows such an impact. This result is partially in line with the findings of Hermes, Lensink, and 
Mehrteab (2005). The authors found that it is only the social ties of the group leader with the rest of 
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the group members that improves repayment performance whereas the social ties among the rest of 
the group members have no impact.  
How can we explain the different impacts of the group leader versus the rest of the group 
members on the repayment performance of the group? We propose three explanations. First, the 
results indicate that the joint liability payment of the group leader reduces the number of days of late 
repayment while the joint liability payments of the rest of the group members don’t. An increase in 
joint liability payment of the group leader raises her marginal benefit of screening, monitoring, and 
enforcement activities. If the group leader performs these activities, the rest of the group members 
may free ride on the group leader efforts to improve the repayment performance of the group. 
Second, the group leader is a representative or a spokesperson of the group who has to face 
the MFW officials in case of a repayment delay or default. Such a role may create a sense of 
responsibility and a source of pressure for the group leader to stay on a group wise good repayment 
behavior. This responsibility of the group leader may puts her under pressure to use her social ties 
and intensify her activities of screening, monitoring and enforcement  to compel other group 
members to make their repayment on time leaving little incentive for the rest of the group members 
to exercise such activities.   
Third, the intermediary function of the group leader between the group members and the 
MFW gives her a relative advantage in obtaining valuable information about the reputation, 
indebtedness and wealth of the rest of the group members. The group leader’s relative advantage in 
obtaining information about the rest of the group members places her in a better position to screen 
borrowers. The screening ability of the group leader therefore can be more efficient than that of 
other group members. In other words, the group leader really uses his knowledge about other group 




   
3.9 Conclusion 
Existing theoretical models generally find that group lending improves repayment 
performance through its ability to mitigate asymmetric information, to generate a new mechanism of 
contract enforcement in the credit market and to exploit social ties among group members. In these 
models, it is assumed that all group members engage in screening, monitoring and enforcement 
activities and harness their social ties to improve repayment performance. In this paper we use data 
from a survey of 160 MFW borrowing groups to test whether the effectiveness of screening, 
monitoring and social ties on repayment performance differs across different group members. In 
particular, we investigate whether the provision of these activities and the joint liability payment 
effects on repayment performance differ between the group leaders and the rest of the group 
members. 
The empirical analysis suggests that the joint liability payment of the group leader lowers the 
days of late repayment while the joint liability payment of the rest of the group members has no 
predictive power on repayment. To our best knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate the positive 
impact of joint liability payment of the group leader on repayment performance. 
We found that the group leader plays a dominant role in screening. The empirical results 
suggest that the group leader’s knowledge about the quality and sales of other group members’ 
occupations improves the group’s repayment performance while such knowledge among the rest of 
the group members has no impact on repayment. Similarly, we found that the knowledge of the 
group leader about the rest of group members’ assets and debts reduces the days of late repayment 
while the knowledge of the rest of the group members about each others’ assets and debts appears 
to be insignificant in explaining repayment.  
The empirical results show no evidence that the monitoring activities of the group leader are 
different in explaining the repayment performance than those of the rest of the group members. 
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Variables measuring monitoring activities of the group leader and the rest of the group members 
enter insignificantly.  
We also found that the social ties of the group leader with the rest of the group members 
and the social ties among the rest of the group members improve repayment. In particular, we found 
that the social ties of a group leader with his relatives and the social ties among relatives in the rest 
of the group members both reduce the days of late repayment. However, the fact that the group 
leader has been in the group since its inception, an indicator of social ties, improves repayment while 
inception among the rest of the group members show mix results.  
The conclusion of the paper suggests that the group leader at the MFW seems to play a 
more important role in improving the repayment behavior of the borrowing groups than the rest of 
the group members. This research can be improved by considering some measures of group 
pressure related to the group leader and the rest of the group members. In particular, the research 
can be extended by testing whether the provision of pressure activities and their effects on 


















In a case where borrowers lack collateral and verifiable credit history, group lending has been 
shown to mitigate the inherent problems associated with the asymmetry of information and the 
enforcement of loan contracts. While there is a host of theoretical models that focused on how 
group lending can overcome these problems, empirical research has lagged behind.  This thesis uses 
data from a self designed survey that the researcher carried out in spring of 2005 to explore the 
factors contributing the success of group lending in achieving high repayment rates. We use the data 
to investigate whether group members improve repayment through their group-wise actions of 
screening, monitoring, enforcement, and the use of social ties among each others. In doing so, we 
first abide with the theoretical work that assume all group members work together in ensuring 
repayment. We then analyze whether the effectiveness of joint liability, screening and monitoring 
activities and the use of social ties differ between the group leader and the rest of the group 
members.  
When we consider the theoretical models on group lending that assumes all group members 
work together to ensure repayment, the empirical results are consistent with vast majority of these 
models. The data suggest that group repayment is improved by screening, peer monitoring, group 
pressure, and social ties.  
We found that group members that have better knowledge about each other occupation in 
terms of quality and sales are associated with better repayment performance. Different proxies for 
the pressure practiced by the group members show its positive impact in improving the repayment 
behavior of the groups. In contrast to previous literature, our results show that relatives in a group 
improve repayment. This supports the hypothesis that more relatives in a group ease the process of 
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monitoring and mitigates moral hazard. Consistent with the effect of relatives, we also find that 
social ties among group members improve repayment. This is one of the central findings of this 
paper. It is consistent with the theoretical predictions but contradicts the vast majority of the 
empirical literature.  
We control for the effect of loan size and other socio-economics characteristics on 
repayment. We found that increasing loan size worsens repayment but further increase dampens it. 
Surprisingly, we found that education worsens repayment. We also found that access to more 
outside credit and group age worsens repayment while asset ownership seems to enhance the 
groups’ ability to repay on time. We found that more religious borrowers are associated with lower 
days of late repayment. 
In most group lending programs including the MFW, group members of a borrowing group 
select a group leader after the group is formed. Group leaders are assigned different tasks to perform 
in their groups. The data allows us to investigate whether the effectiveness of joint liability, screening 
and monitoring activities and the use of social ties effects on repayment performance differ between 
the group leaders and the rest of the group members. 
The empirical results show that the group leader at the MFW plays a more important role in 
improving the repayment behavior of the borrowing groups than the rest of the group members. 
The joint liability payment of the group leader improves repayment while the joint liability payment 
of the rest of the group members lacks such a predictive power. To our best knowledge, we are the 
first to document this result. We found that the group leader’s knowledge about the quality and sales 
of other group members’ occupations improves the group repayment while such knowledge among 
the rest of the group members has no impact on repayment. Similarly, the group leader’s knowledge 
about the assets and debts of other group members improves repayment while such knowledge 
among the rest of the group members does not. The empirical results show no evidence that the 
 72
  
   
monitoring activities of the group leader are different in explaining the group repayment behavior 
than those of the rest of the group members. We found that the social ties of the group leader with 
the rest of the group members and the social ties among the rest of the group members both 
improve repayment.  
 This thesis suggests that repayment performance of group lending institutions is likely to be 
more successful if group members screen and monitor each other, impose greater pressure and have 
stronger social ties. It also suggests that group lending institutions should recognize the important 
role played by the group leader in improving the overall repayment behavior of the group and take 
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A5: Visit Results 
1. completed and ready for data entry 
2. partially completed  
3. group leader unavailable 
4. group leader refused interview 
5. group leader provided unsatisfactory answers 
6. others (specify) 
 
A6 Name of Respondent _________________________________ 
 
A6 
[                      ] 
A7 Sex of Respondent 
 
A7 
Male,     Female 
A8 What is the most convenient phone number to reach the respondent         
      at? 
A8 
[                      ]  
A9 Whose phone number is this? 
1. The respondent’s home phone number 
2. The respondent’s partner phone number 
3. Phone number of a relative 
4. Others 
A9 
[                       ] 
A10 Is the respondent the group leader? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
       (If yes, go to A15, if no go to A11) 
A10 
Yes,        No 
A11 Name of Group Leader________________________________ 
 
A11 
A12 Sex of Group Leader (1. Male, 2. Female) A12 
[                       ] 
A13 What is the most convenient phone number to call the  
        respondent?________________________________________ 
A13 
 
A14 Whose phone number is this? 
1. The leader’s home phone number 
2. The leader’s partner phone number 
3. Phone number of a relative 
4. Others 
A14 
[                       ] 
A15 Where is the branch office of the MFW that this group goes to?  
       __________________________________________________ 
A15 
 
A16 What is the name of the MFW officer for whom this group talk to   







   
 
 
B. Group Age 
B1 When was this group established? Month/Year.  B1 [                ] 
B2 When was the first loan this group took since establishment?  
      Month/Year 
B2 [                ] 
 
C. Group Number 
C1 How many members in the group? C1 [                ] 
 
D. Loan Size 
D1 For your group what is the current loan size?  D1 [                ] 
D2 For your group what is the duration of the loan in weeks? D2 [                ] 
D2 Is the repayment due in monthly or biweekly installments?  D3 [                ] 
 
E. Interest Rate 
E1 What is the interest rate on your current loan? E1 [                ] 
E2 Would you prefer to borrow more at this interest rate?  
     (If yes go to E3, if no go to F1 ) 
E2 [                ] 
E3 How much would you prefer to borrow at this interest rate? E3 [                ] 
 
F. Characteristic of the Group 
 
F1. (Write the group members’ names. Record first and last name. Ask the following    
       questions to fill in the table)   
F2. How old is this person? 
F3. Is this person married? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
F4. How many children this person have? 
F5. What is the primary occupation of this person? 
F6. How many Donums (Acres) does this person have? 
F7. What is this person level of education? (1. read 2. Elementary 3. Preliminary 4. High   
      school 5. Two year college, 6. Four year college 7. Master) 
F8. Does this person have a home phone? (1.Yes, 2. No) 
F9. Does this person have a cell phone? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
F10. Has this person been in the group since the group started? (1.Yes, 2. No) 
F11. Does this person pray five times a day? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
F12. Does this person observe Ramadan? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
F13. Does this person observe the morning prayer on time? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
 






















1              
2              
3              
4              
5              
6              
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G1. Has anyone ever been rejected to join the group?  
      (1. Yes, 2. No) (If yes go to G2 if no go to G3) 
G1 
[                      ]             






G3. Are there people who would like to join the group but cannot? 
      (1. Yes, 2. No) (If yes go to G4 if no go to G5) 
G3 
[                      ] 






G5. Is the group leader aware of the quality and sales of other   
       member’s work? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
G5  
[                      ]             
G6. Is the group leader aware of the following: 
G6.1 Debt and savings that members have with the MFW 
G6.2 Debt and savings that members have with banks other than MFW 
G6.3 Debt that members have with other individuals 
G6.4 Assets (i.e. land, autos, etc.) that members have  
 
G6.1  [             ] 
G6.2 [             ] 
G6.3 [             ] 
G6.4 [             ] 
G7. Are other group members aware of the quality and sales of other  
       member’s work (1. Yes, 2. No) 
G7 [                ] 
 
G8. Are other members aware of the following: 
G8.1 Debt and savings that members have with the MFW 
G8.2 Debt and savings that members have with banks other than MFW 
G8.3 Debt that members have with other individuals  
G8.4 Assets (i.e. land, auto, etc.) that members have 
 
G8.1[              ] 
G8.2[              ] 
G8.3[              ] 
























A. Pair Wise Relatives 
 
H1A. (In the first row and first column, write the group names. Make sure that names are written in 
the same order in both the first column and the first row.)  
H2A. Is person 1 a close relative of person 2, 3, 4, 5, 6? (1. Yes, 2. No).  Is person 2 a close relative 
of 3, 4, 5, 6? (1. Yes, 2. No). Is person 3 a close relative of 4, 5, 6? (1. Yes, 2. No). Is person 4 a close 
relative of 5, 6? (1. Yes, 2. No). Is person 5 a close relative of 6? (1. Yes, 2. No). 
 
Name 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. 0      
2.  0     
3.   0    
4.    0   
5.     0  
6.      0 
 
B. Pair Wise Distance between Places of Work.  
 
H2B. (In the first row and first column, write the group names. Make sure that names are written in 
the same order in both the first column and the first row. Write distances in kilometers)  
H2B. How far is person 1 business from 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 businesses? How far is person 2 business from 
3, 4, 5, 6 businesses? How far is person 3 business from persons 4, 5, 6 businesses? How far is 
person 4 business from 5, 6 businesses? How far is person 5 business from 6 business?  
 
Name 1.  2.  3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. 0      
2.  0     
3.   0    
4.    0   
5.     0  
6.      0 
 
 
H3. Has any group member ever used his loan for purposes other than  
       business expenditures? (1. Yes, 2. No)  
H3 




















J1. In the past 8 months, has anyone in the  
      group coordinated with_______ to  
      choose the place of business? 
  
J2. In the past 8 months, has anyone in the  
      group referred a customer to ________? 
  
J3. In the past 8 months, has anyone in the  
      group helped______ with free labor?  
  
J4. In the past 8 months, has anyone in the  
      group helped______ with money? 
  
J5. In the past 8 months, has anyone in the  
      group coordinated with_______ to buy  
      input goods? 
  
J6. In the past 8 months, has anyone in the  
      group coordinated with_______ to sell  
      goods?  
  
 
I. Outside Credit Options 
 
I1. How many members in the group have access to other credit  
      sources (from banks)? (If there is any one member who has   
      access to other sources of credit (from banks), then go to I2, if  
      not, go to I3) 
I1 
[                            ] 
I2. Why did they choose to borrow from the MFW rather than from  







[                            ] 
I3. How many members in the group have access to other credit  
      sources (from individuals)? (If there is any one member  who  
      has access to other sources of credit (from individuals), then go  
      to I4, if not, go to K1 ) 
I3 
[                           ] 
I4. Why did they choose to borrow from the MFW rather than from  












   
 
K. Social Ties 
 
K1. Can you get help from your group member when you need it?  
       (1. Yes, 2. No)   
K1 [       ] 
K2. If you were caring for a child and needed to go out for a while, would          
       you ask your group member for help? (1. Yes, 2. No)  
K2 [       ] 
K3. Have you visited a group member in the past week? (1. Yes, 2. No)  K3 [       ] 
K4. In the past week, how many phone conversations have you had with        
       your group members?  
K4 [       ] 
K5. If you need information to make a decision, do you talk to your group     
       member to find that information? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
K5 [       ] 
K6. If you have a dispute with your group member, are you willing to seek    
       mediation from others? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
K6 [       ] 
K7. Do you prefer to buy or sell goods or services from other group   
       members or from other individuals? 
      (1. From group member, 2. From other individuals)   
K7 [      ] 
 
L. Group Pressure 
 
L1. If a group member is late in repaying, are group members willing to    
       pressure him to repay? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
L1  
[                   ] 
L2. Do group members feel practicing such pressure is difficult? 
       (1. Yes, 2. No) 
L2 
[                   ] 
L3. Do group members feel moral obligations to repay group loan? 
       (1. Yes, 2. No) 
L3 
[                   ]             
L4. Do group members repay to stay on good terms with group?  
       (1. Yes, 2. No) 
L4 
[                   ] 
L5. Is there any internal code to punish a group member who defaults?    
       (1. Yes, 2. No)  
L5 
[                  ] 
 
M. Delinquency Issues 
 
M1.(internal incidence of delinquency) In the past 8 months, was there  
       any group member who was not able to manage getting his biweekly   
       or monthly installment? 
       (1. Yes, 2. No) (if Yes, go to M2, if no, go to M3) 
M1 
[                  ] 
M2. Did the group help this person to collect the required installment? 
        (1. Yes, 2.No) 
 
M3. (external incidence of delinquency) In the past 8 months, was 
there   
        any group member who did not pay his installment to the MFW on    
        time? (1. Yes, 2. No) 
M2 
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